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Accommodating Growth and
Development After Guilderland: Is the
New York Legislature About to (Re)Act
on Impact Fees?
Michael G. Sterthous
This Comment analyzes a problem facing many lo-
cal governments in New York State - trying to accommo-
date growth and development with adequate public in-
frastructure in a time when federal and state funds have
been reduced and the general public is vehemently op-
posed to increased taxes. While not permitted to stop
growth, some municipalities have attempted to make
new development pay its fair share of the costs for addi-
tional infrastructure. Such actions have received a nega-
tive response by the New York State Court of Appeals
which has held that local governments lack proper au-
thority to condition development approval on exaction of
fees for off-site improvements. The author concludes
that legislative action at the state level is needed in this
area and offers some suggestions.
I. Introduction
"Zoning . . . is essentially a legislative act."'1
The New York State Legislature has maintained a policy
of complacency in guiding local municipal zoning authority
over the past several years. As a result, it has been the local
1. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 111, 341 N.E.2d 236, 243, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672, 682 (1975).
2. This conclusion is based on review of the state zoning enabling legislation,
codified at N.Y. ToWN LAw art. 16, §§ 261-284 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1991), which
demonstrates inactivity on the part of the state legislature. Section 261 of the Town
Law is the general state zoning authority enabling provision. This statute became
1
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governing bodies, tempered by an active state judiciary, that
have formulated the metes and bounds of New York's emerg-
ing zoning practices. 3 In the area of growth management, this
combination of legislative indifference and judicial constraint
of municipal authority has created a difficult fiscal situation
for local governments."
In response to efforts by suburban municipalities to con-
trol surging development pressures, the state judiciary has
mandated that local governments are prohibited from exclud-
ing development.5 At the same time, the judiciary has main-
tained that local governments have an obligation to accommo-
date development with adequate services and infrastructure.
Due to decreases in federal and state funding, local govern-
ments have been left holding the infrastructure bill.' How-
ever, current local financing mechanisms, in place to pay for
the needs of new development, are proving inadequate.'
In light of this situation, municipalities have sought to
shift some of these costs to the very source of the need for
increased infrastructure, the new development. This has taken
effective in 1932. Since then, it has only been amended twice, once in 1956, and again
in 1989 with the addition of Section 261-a, establishing transfer of development
rights. Section 274-a, which grants local authority for site plan approval, became ef-
fective in 1976 without significant amendment since then. Section 276, which creates
local authority for subdivision approval, became effective in 1973 and also has not
been significantly amended since. See also 1 R. ANDERSON, NEW YORK ZONING LAW &
PRACTICE § 2.02 (3d ed. 1984).
3. See McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 111 Misc. 2d 1046, 1057, 445 N.Y.S.2d
859, 867 (Sup. Ct. 1981)("[P]olice power resides within the state and is delegated by
it, insofar as zoning is concerned, to the town."), aff'd as modified on other grounds,
105 A.D.2d 46, 482 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1984), aff'd, 66 N.Y.2d 544, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 498
N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985). See also R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.02 (3d ed.
1986)("[M]ost states have chosen not to use the zoning power but to delegate it.").
4. See infra notes 69-98 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 33-56 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 57-68 and accompanying text. "[I]nfrastructure represents a
set of services, such as reliable transport of goods and people, fresh water, protection
from floods, and safe disposal of wastes." Rutledge, Public Infrastructure as a Na-
tional Concern, 11 A.B.A. SEC. URB., ST. & Loc. L. NEWSL. 1, 16 (1987)(discussing the
conclusions of the National Council on Public Works Improvement).
7. See Morgan, Duncan & McClendon, Drafting Impact Fee Ordinances: Legal
Foundations for Exactions, 9 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 49 (1986).
8. Id. See also infra notes 69-98 and accompanying text.
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IMPACT FEES
many forms, including dedications and in-lieu fees,9 exac-
tions,10 special improvement districts,1  and impact fees.1
2
These efforts have been the source of much adjudication,
which has led to confusion regarding the authority local gov-
ernments retain to regulate this area.
The impact fee,' 3 while the most innovative source of lo-
cal revenue for accommodating growth and development, has
met the most controversy. Nationwide, municipalities in over
thirty-nine states impose impact fees of one sort or another on
new development." In many states, local authority to enact
impact fee ordinances is implied through the generally dele-
gated local police powers, or similarly through the general
zoning powers.'1 In others, such implied authority is insuffi-
cient, and authority to exact impact fees must necessarily be
found in specific state enabling legislation."8 The New York
9. See infra notes 107-132 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 133-164 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 173-238 and accompanying text.
13. Impact fees are defined as single payments required of developers as a condi-
tion of approval, to be used by localities to pay the development's proportionate
share of the cost of off-site public facilities or services necessitated by new develop-
ment. DELAWARE VALLEY REGIONAL PLANNING COMM'N, REGIONWIDE ASSESSMENT OF
NON-TRANSPORTATION IMPAcT FEES 6 (Sept. 1989)(available from the Delaware Valley
Regional Planning Commission, 21 South Fifth Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19106)
[hereinafter REGIONWIDE ASSESSMENT].
14. Issues in Focus: Impact Fees in New York - Back to the Drawing Board,
Senate Res. Serv. (N.Y. St. Senate) No. 36, at 2 (Jan. 16, 1990).
15. See Wood Bros. Homes v. City of Colorado Springs, 193 Colo. 543, 568 P.2d
487 (1977)(the court held that the Colorado constitution authorized home rule cities
to pass ordinances to alleviate local problems such as drainage by charging develop-
ment fees); Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla.
1976)(landmark decision setting forth judicial prescription for constitutional fee ordi-
nances in Florida); Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of Plainfield, 117 N.H. 817,
379 A.2d 200 (1977)(under enabling authority to regulate subdivisions, town could
legitimately condition subdivision approval on the provision of improvements to off-
site access roads); Amherst Builders v. City of Amherst, 61 Ohio St. 2d 345, 402
N.E.2d 1181 (1980)(authority to impose connection fees implied from broad interpre-
tation of state constitution); Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah
1979)(authority to require dedication of land or in-lieu fee for flood control and recre-
ation facilities implied from the general welfare clause of state statute); Coulter v.
City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1983)(authority to impose impact fees for water
and sewer connections implied from state enabling statutes).
16. See City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So. 2d 363 (Ala.
1990]
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Judiciary has adopted the latter school of thought.
In November 1989, the New York State Court of Appeals
effectively dispelled all local authority to use impact fees as a
means of funding roadway expansion and improvements,
when it upheld the appellate division decision in Albany Area
Builders Association, Inc. v. Town of Guilderland.1 7 While
paying lip service to local authority to legislate under the Mu-
nicipal Home Rule,"8 the court held that the area of roadway
improvement financing was preempted by the financing provi-
sions of the New York State Highway Law and Town Law.19
It is likely that such a preemption ruling will defeat attempts
to use the impact fee in other areas of growth accommodation
as well.20 With such a formidable hurdle, discussion of
whether impact fee ordinances effect a regulatory taking, levy
an unconstitutional tax, or violate due process or equal pro-
tection rights, becomes less relevant.21
After Guilderland, the only hope municipalities have for
shifting some of the financial burden to accommodate growth
lies with the state legislature. New state legislation, or amend-
ment to the present zoning enabling act, will eliminate the
costly and confusing litigation resulting from the trial-and-er-
ror local legislative practices in this area. If properly drafted,
such legislation will alleviate the present lack of local lawmak-
1978)(court held that "without specific legislative authorization, the City had no
power to require the payment of a fee in lieu of dedication of land for public parks");
Eastern Diversified Properties, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 319 Md. 45, 570 A.2d 850
(1990)(impact fee imposed as a condition on building permit approval was a tax
which the county lacked authority to impose); Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Township of
Holmdel, 121 N.J. 550, 583 A.2d 277 (1990)(mandatory development fees constituted
a proper municipal exercise of police power, provided specific statutory authority was
delegated by state).
17. 74 N.Y.2d 372, 546 N.E.2d 920, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1989), aff'g, 141 A.D.2d
293, 534 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1988).
18. Id. at 376, 546 N.E.2d at 921-22, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 628.
19. Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d at 377-78, 546 N.E.2d at 922, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
20. See Coconato v. Town of Esopus, 152 A.D.2d 39, 547 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1989)(lo-
cal authority to finance capital improvements in a water district is preempted by the
state legislature after the Guilderland decision).
21. See Steinman, Impact Fees, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1990, at 1, col. 1. See also Kee-
nan, A Perspective: New York Communities and Impact Fees, 7 PACE ENVTL L. REV.
329 (1990); Comment, Impact Fee Exactions in New York: The Taxman Always




ing authority in this area, and will guide the creation of local
ordinances that treat municipalities, developers, and residents
in the most equitable manner possible.
Section II of this Comment contains general background
information pertaining to development trends and the prac-
tices of growth management. New York's judicial mandate
against excluding growth is set forth in Section III, followed
by an analysis of the municipal obligation to accommodate
growth with adequate infrastructure in Section IV. Section V
demonstrates the financial burden that growth accommoda-
tion has placed on local governments, while Section VI out-
lines local authority to meet these burdens in New York State
through various growth management mechanisms. Section VII
concludes with recommendations and suggestions for state
legislative action to guide municipalities in their efforts to ac-
commodate growth and development.
II. Perspective
"Local growth management is defined as a conscious gov-
ernment program intended to influence the rate,
amount, type, location and/or quality of future develop-
ment and the provision of services within a local
jurisdiction."22
The first half of the twentieth century witnessed a steady
migration of population to urban areas which fueled metro-
politan growth.2 3 However, due to a combination of factors,
including overpopulation and overcrowding, a prohibitive high
cost of living, increased mobility due to improved transporta-
tion facilities, and a desire for open space, this migration has
reversed in the latter half of the century.2 4 By the end of the
1970's, more people lived in the suburban fringes of metropol-
itan areas than in the central cities for the first time in his-
22. D. GODSCHALK, D. BROWER, L. MCBENNETT, B. VESTAL & D. HERR, CONSTITU-
TIONAL ISSUES OF GROWTH MANAGEMENT 8 (1979) [hereinafter GODSCHALK].
23. Id. at 6.
24. Id. See also Juergensmeyer & Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer to Local Gov-
ernments' Capital Funding Dilemma, 14 LAND USE & ENV'T L. REV. 247 (1983).
1990]
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tory.2 5 This exodus has continued through the 1980's. The
ring of developing suburbia has expanded, with new develop-
ment leapfrogging into counties and villages that have, up to
this point, been practically undeveloped.2 6
Faced with the pressure for new development, local mu-
nicipalities have turned to their delegated zoning powers to
organize this growth. However, growth management has be-
come much more than siting new homes and similar types of
physical construction.2 7 Growth carries extra-developmental
ramifications, creating burdens on existing infrastructure and
increasing the demand for more capital services and facili-
ties.2 ' Local growth management can thus be defined as a
"conscious government program intended to influence the
rate, amount, type, location and/or quality of future develop-
ment and the provision of services within a local jurisdic-
tion. '29 The extent of local government regulatory authority
in this area has become one of constant debate in academia,
3 0
25. GODSCHALK, supra note 22, at 6; Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 24, at
247 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1979, at 17 (100th ed. 1979) ("Between 1970 and 1978 the white population of central
cities in the United States decreased at an annual rate of 1.2 percent.")).
26. CORNELL COOPERATIVE EXTENSION OF DUTCHESS COUNTY & AMERICAN FARM-
LAND TRUST, COST OF COMMUNITY SERVICES STUDY (1989) [hereinafter COST OF COM-
MUNITY SERVICES STUDY]. Between 1950 and 1980, the population of Dutchess County,
New York, has increased 80%, from 136,781 to 245,055. Id. at 2. Current estimates
predict a population of 326,000 by the year 2010. Id. Indicative of this trend, the
number of housing units in the county has increased by 25.6% over the ten year
period of 1970 to 1980. Id. See also Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102,
105, 341 N.E.2d 236, 238-39, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 676 (1975)(since 1950, the Town of
New Castle has had a three-fold increase in population from 5,312 to 17,000).
27. Nicholas, Impact Exactions: Economic Theory, Practice, and Incidence, 50
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 87 (1987).
28. DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS 8 (J. Frank & R. Rhodes eds. 1987)(capital facilities
provided and maintained by local governments include: schools, roads, sewerage sys-
tems, stormwater drainage, water supply, transit facilities, airports, solid waste dispo-
sal, police and fire protection, recreational services, libraries, museums, civic centers,
parking structures, and social services).
29. GODSCHALK, supra note 22, at 8.
30. See Keenan, A Perspective: New York Communities and Impact Fees, 7
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 329 (1990); Comment, Impact Fee Exactions in New York: The
Taxman Always Rings Twice, 52 ALB. L. REV. 287 (1987)(authored by David D.
DiBari); Note, Impact Fees in Pennsylvania: Requiring Land Developers to Bear




the legislature,3' and the courts.32  In New York State, the ju-
diciary has led the way in defining this authority.
ing). See also Nelson, Land Exaction: A Selective Bibliography, 50 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 177 (1987).
31. Since 1989, thirteen states have enacted specific impact fee enabling legisla-
tion authorizing local governments to charge new development a proportionate share
of the cost of accommodating it with new or improved infrastructure. See infra note
321.
32. See Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Scottsdale, 116 Ariz. 340, 569 P.2d 292
(Ct. App. 1977)(ordinance levying water development charge on developers for units
for which building permits were obtained after effective date of ordinance was valid);
William S. Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Comm'n., 226 Cal.
App. 3d 1612, 277 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1991)(county was not prohibited from denying zon-
ing change based on inadequacy of school facilities); Bixel Assocs. v. City of Los An-
geles, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1208, 265 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1989)(city failed to show that
method used to determine amount of fire hydrant fee bore a fair and reasonable rela-
tion to developer's benefit from fee as required to avoid invalidation as unauthorized
tax); City of Arvada v. City & County of Denver, 663 P.2d 611 (Colo. 1983)(city had
authority to impose development fee on new users of city water system without in-
fringing upon equal protection rights); City of Key West v. R.L.J.S. Corp., 537 So. 2d
641 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)(assessment of developmental impact fees upon develop-
ers of condominium apartment building did not violate developers' constitutionally
protected rights); Downey v. Wells Sanitary Dist., 561 A.2d 174 (Me. 1989)(decision
to impose a sewer impact fee on residential and commercial developments, for which
occupancy permits were issued after particular date, did not deny equal protection);
Eastern Diversified Properties, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 319 Md. 45, 570 A.2d 850
(1990)(impact fee imposed as a condition on building permit approval was a tax
which the county lacked authority to impose); Beauty Built Constr. Corp. v. City of
Warren, 375 Mich. 229, 134 N.W.2d 214 (1965)(city ordinance that required water
development charge on future building permits rather than future connections did
not deny equal protection); Lechner v. City of Billings, 797 P.2d 191 (Mont.
1990)(municipality had authority to establish fees collected from new users for pur-
pose of funding portion of cost of future expansion of water and sewer systems);
Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Township of Holmdel, 121 N.J. 550, 583 A.2d 277
(1990)(mandatory development fees constituted a proper municipal exercise of police
power, provided specific statutory authority was delegated by state); Cranberry
Township v. Builders Ass'n, No. 90-386 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Feb. 6, 1991)(WESTLAW,
States library, Pa. case file)(new state zoning amendment provides retroactive author-
ity for local government that enacted an impact fee ordinance prior to June 1, 1990,
to impose such fees); Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah
1981)(advance collection of water connection fee and park improvement fee from sub-
divider designed to raise funds to enlarge and improve sewer and water systems and
recreational opportunities would be valid provided they were reasonable).
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III. Non-Exclusion Mandate
"We only require that communities confront the chal-
lenge of population growth with open doors."3
In facing the pressures of surging development, suburban
municipalities have turned to their legislatively delegated
powers to zone. The authority to zone, and therefore control
the extent, pace, and character of land development, has tra-
ditionally been considered a matter of local governance.3 ' In
New York State, the power to zone has been granted to local
municipalities by the state zoning enabling act, section 26i of
the Town Law.3
A majority of suburban and exurban communities in New
York are residentially zoned for single-family dwellings." As
noted in Section II, population growth and other factors have
created increased demands on these areas for other forms of
low to moderate income housing.3 7 Exurban areas tend to re-
33. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 379, 285 N.E.2d 291, 302, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, 153, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
34. R. ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 2.02. See also Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467,
485, 167 N.E. 705, 711 (1929) (Cardozo, C.J., concurring)("A zoning resolution in
many features is distinctively a city affair, a concern of the locality.
35. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261 (McKinney 1987). Section 261 states:
For the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, or the general wel-
fare of the community, the town board is hereby empowered by ordinance to
regulate and restrict the height, number of stories and size of buildings and
other structures, the percentage of lot that may be occupied . . . and the
location and use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, resi-
dence or other purposes; provided that such regulations shall apply to and
affect only such part of the town as is outside of any incorporated village or
city ....
Id. Accord N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-700 (McKinney 1973).
36. R. ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 8.03. "Exurban" communities are generally de-
fined as "those beyond the suburbs of a city, inhabited chiefly by the well-to-do."
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 458 (1986).
37. See, e.g., GODSCHALK, supra note 22, at 7 (quoting H. PERLOFF, AGENDA FOR
THE NEW URBAN ERA (1975)).
Much of the current demand for new residential development is due to the
coming of age of the baby-boom generation that followed World War II. ...
"All in all, demographic factors point toward a strong future demand for
smaller, multifamily housing units, close to public transportation, shopping




sist this type of development, and have used their local zoning
powers to guide it elsewhere. 8
Cognizant of these trends and tendencies, the New York
Court of Appeals has interpreted the legislatively delegated
zoning power as a local responsibility to positively guide
growth.39 To this end, the court has mandated municipalities
not to exclude or immunize themselves, but rather to accom-
modate future growth and development. 0
This judicial mandate was given life in the landmark de-
new development and toward preventing further urban sprawl reflect these
implicit needs."
Id.
38. See Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975)(discussed infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text). See gener-
ally R. ANDERSON, supra note 2, §§ 8.01-.13.
"Exclusionary zoning" has been defined as land use control regulations that
"serve[] to erect exclusionary walls on the municipality's boundary according to local
selfishness for socially improper goals which are beyond the legitimate purpose of
zoning." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1619 (6th ed. 1990). See National Land & Inv. Co.
v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965)(reasoning behind various exclusionary zon-
ing regulations includes: to preserve property values, insure adequate light and air, to
protect the appearance of the community, to preserve the existing character of neigh-
borhoods, and to preserve the public health by providing adequate land to handle the
sewage problem in the absence of public disposal systems; another reason low and
moderate income housing is often excluded is that it places an increased pressure on
public services while adding a much lower resource base to help pay for it).
39. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138,
appeal dismissed, 409. U.S. 1003 (1972).
40. Id. at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152. For a similar perspective
outside of New York, see National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d
597 (1965).
Zoning is a means by which a government body can plan for the future - it
may not be used as a means to deny the future . . . .A zoning ordinance
whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance to newcomers in order to
avoid future burdens, economic or otherwise, upon the administration of
public services and facilities can not be held valid.
Id. at 528, 532, 215 A.2d at 610, 612. See also Southern Burlington NAACP v. Town-
ship of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 208, 456 A.2d 390, 415 (1983)(municipalities' land
use regulations that do not provide the requisite opportunity for a fair share of the
region's need for low to moderate income housing conflict with the general welfare
and violate the state constitutional requirements of substantive due process and
equal protection). Conversely, courts in Florida have upheld the validity of exclusion-
ary zoning provisions without qualification. Blank v. Town of Lake Clarke Shores,
161 So. 2d 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Gautier v. Town of Jupiter Island, 142 So.
2d 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
1990]
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cision of Golden v. Planning Board."' The Town of Ramapo
designed an innovative zoning ordinance which intended to
control growth through sequencing development with the pro-
vision of capital improvements. 42 The town's goal was to per-
mit residential development to grow in conjunction with an
eighteen-year capital improvement schedule.43 Subdivision
permits were granted on the condition of acquiring a certain
number of "development points. '44 Points were awarded for
the presence of sufficient services such as sewers, drainage,
park or recreation facilities, improved roads, and firehouses.15
Permit approval was suspended until such time that these
necessary services were put in place by the municipality,"" in
accord with its improvement schedule.' 7 Theoretically, this
system could postpone a project for up to the full eighteen
years of the planned improvement schedule. To reduce such a
postponement, a developer was authorized to speed up the
permit process by voluntarily installing the improvements at
his own cost, thereby, in effect, purchasing the required
points."
In upholding the validity of the Ramapo ordinance, the
court of appeals found that the restriction on development
was only temporary and that the plan's ultimate purpose was
to enhance the municipality's ability to accommodate future
growth. 9 Therefore, it held that the Ramapo plan was not ex-
clusionary, but was within the authority of the zoning ena-
bling legislation. 0 The court qualified its holding by adding:
"What we will not countenance . . . under any guise, is com-
munity efforts at immunization or exclusion.""'
41. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
1003 (1972).
42. Id. at 369, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
43. Id. at 368, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
44. Id. at 369, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at .144.
45. Id. at 368, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143-44.
46. See infra notes 57-68.
47. Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 368, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
48. Id. at 368-69, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
49. Id. at 369, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144-45.
50. Id. at 371, 285 N.E.2d at 297, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 146.




Reemphasizing its Golden mandate, the court of appeals,
in a later decision, Berenson v. Town of New Castle,52 held
that a municipality is under a duty to consider not only the
needs of its own residents, but also the demands of the sur-
rounding region if such is not being provided for in an ade-
quate manner." At issue in Berenson was a zoning ordinance
that refused to permit any multiple-family dwelling develop-
ment within the Town of New Castle. 4 The court held that
"[iun enacting a zoning ordinance, consideration must be given
to regional needs. . . .There must be a balancing of the local
desire to maintain the status quo within the community and
the greater public interest that regional needs be met.' '5 5 As a
result, on remand, the original ordinance was ruled an invalid
exercise of the local zoning authority."0
The foregoing cases and discussion present the premise
that under New York State zoning practices, exclusion of
growth and development is prohibited. Concurrent with this
premise, the next section sets forth the traditionally implied
belief that local municipalities are obligated to provide their
communities with the infrastructure to accommodate this
growth.
52. 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
53. Id. at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
54. Id. at 105, 341 N.E.2d at 239, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 676. The town's zoning ordi-
nance was based on minimum lot sizes. Id. None of the town's districts made allow-
ance for development of multiple-family dwellings. Id.
55. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
The court also addressed the need for legislative guidance in matters of zoning:
Zoning ... is essentially a legislative act. Thus, it is quite anomalous that a
court should be required to perform the tasks of a regional planner. To that
end, we look to the Legislature to make appropriate changes in order to fos-
ter the development of programs designed to achieve sound regional plan-
ning. While the people of New Castle may fervently desire to be left alone by
the forces of change, the ultimate determination is not solely theirs.
Id. at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 682. Since Berenson, the state legisla-
ture has remained indifferent to regional planning, and thus the towns and courts are
left to debate over its proper application.
56. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, No. 73-4239, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 6,
1977), aff'd in part, 67 A.D.2d 506, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1979).
1990]
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IV. Obligation to Accommodate
"[The] obvious purpose [of growth management] is to
prevent premature subdivision absent essential munici-
pal facilities and to insure continuous development com-
mensurate with the Town's obligation to provide suchfacilities.-"5'
It is a generally accepted belief that the provision and
maintenance of "public" services and facilities is the responsi-
bility of the local government. 8 In the past, the provision of
large federal and state grants and subsidies for roads and sew-
ers created the impression that public services meant govern-
ment-provided services. 9 The labels "municipal services" and
"public facilities" support the continued inference that they
are government-provided and funded. However, there is no
constitutional mandate that new facilities, such as education,
transportation, and recreation, be underwritten by the general
population through increased taxes, rather than by the new
residents who created the need for the additional
infrastructure 00
In New York, this municipal obligation to provide public
services may be inferred from the Town Law. Section 263 sets
forth the policy behind the state zoning enabling act: "Such
regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive
plan and designed to . . .facilitate the adequate provision of
transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks and other pub-
lic requirements .. . ."I' Further, an obligation for the provi-
sion of services and facilities has been espoused in language of
57. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 379, 285 N.E.2d 291, 302, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, 152, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
58. See Larsen & Zimet, Impact Fees: Et Tu Illinois?, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
489 (1988). "Many individuals believed then and still do today, that municipalities
have an 'obligation' to provide water, sewer and roads in support of growth and devel-
opment, no matter what the financial implication of that obligation." Id. at 489.
59. Id. at 490. See, e.g., Bell, All the King's Horses and All the King's Men.
EPA J., May, 1988, at 13 (a 5% increase in federal tax on motor fuel in 1984 made
additional funding possible for highway improvements).
60. Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 24, at 257.




the New York courts.
In Charles v. Diamond,62 a local ordinance requiring new
development to connect to the public sewer system was chal-
lenged. Because the current municipal system was inadequate
to accommodate additional pressure, a developer was prohib-
ited from building until the system was upgraded. The court
held that such an ordinance, as well as the temporary morato-
rium on development that it effectuated, was valid provided
the delay was reasonable. 4 The court noted that a municipal-
ity is vested with discretion in determining whether construc-
tion of municipal improvements is necessary and the form, ex-
tent, and location of such improvements. 5 Delay, as in this
case, is justified provided the municipality displays a commit-
ment to the construction and installation of the "necessary
improvements. ' 66 Also, in Golden v. Planning Board, 7 the
court reasoned that when a community undertakes "to pro-
vide required municipal services" in a rational manner, courts
are rightfully reluctant to strike down such a plan, even if de-
velopment is temporarily restrained.6 8 Through such language,
New York courts have acknowledged that the provision of ad-
equate infrastructure is a necessary obligation of local gov-
erning bodies, and require that they affirmatively act to ac-
commodate the need being generated for it.
V. Inadequate Revenues
"As tax bases grow, so do town budgets, and so do tax
62. 41 N.Y.2d 318, 360 N.E.2d 1295, 392 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1977).
63. Id. at 323, 360 N.E.2d at 1299, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
64. Id. at 324, 360 N.E.2d at 1300, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
65. Id. at 326, 360 N.E.2d at 1303, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
66. Id. at 326, 360 N.E.2d at 1301, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
67. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
1003 (1972).
68. Id. at 379, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 153. Accord Robert Muellers
Assocs. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 30 Pa. Commw. 386, 373 A.2d 1173 (1977)(the primary
responsibility for providing improvements and services lies with local governments,
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rates for individual residents."' 9
In light of the mandate against exclusion, the obligation
to actively provide public services and infrastructure to ac-
commodate the pattern of increasing growth and development
has placed a major burden on local government revenues."0
Traditionally, the federal government has played a significant
role in funding infrastructure and public services through spe-
cial taxes, trust funds, and various construction grant pro-
grams.7 1 For example, a 1984 federal tax increase of 5% on
gasoline created increased revenues for highway develop-
ment.7 2 However, studies have shown that public works ex-
penditures at all levels of government have dropped from 20%
in 1950, to 7% in 1984.7' Additionally, since 1960, vehicle
miles travelled per dollar of public spending have increased by
3.5% annually, further suggesting that the public sector is not
spending enough to meet growing transportation needs.7'
This trend has been amplified in recent years by the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings federal budget balancing amend-
ments of 1985 and 1987.7' The resulting federal spending re-
69. Hoagland, Does Expanding the Tax Base Really Cut Taxes?, DUTCHESS
LAND CONSERVANCY NEWS (Winter 1987).
70. See id. See also COST OF COMMUNITY SERVICES STUDY, supra note 26; Bell,
supra note 59.
71. Delaney, Gordon & Hess, The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test for
Validating Subdivision Exactions, User Impact Fees and Linkage, 50 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 139, 140 (1987). See also Weschler, Mushkatel & Frank, Politics & Ad-
ministration of Development Exactions, in DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS 15, 16 (J. Frank
& R. Rhodes eds. 1987); Lamb, Financing Regional Infrastructure, 11 A.B.A. SEC.
URB.. ST. & Loc. L. NEWSL. 19 (1987).
72. Bell, supra note 59, at 13. See Delaney, Gordon & Hess, supra note 71, at
140 (other federally subsidized programs include: the EPA Grant Program for Con-
struction of Waste Water Treatment Facilities, the Economic Development Adminis-
tration Public Works Program, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
Community and Urban Development Grant Programs and housing subsidy programs,
the Department of Transportation highway programs, and the Urban Mass Transit
Administration programs for public transit).
73. Financing America's Public Infrastructure: Issues for Local Governments,
22 AKRON L. REV. 381 (1989) [hereinafter Financing America's Public
Infrastructure].
74. Bell, supra note 59, at 13-14.
75. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-




duction scheme indicates that federal aid for construction
programs has taken a back seat to the so-called higher priori-
ties of defense, the annual deficit, and decreasing the national
debt. 6
A recent report of the National Council on Public Works
Improvement adds perspective to the continuing decrease in
capital spending." The Council declared that the quality of
America's infrastructure is barely adequate to fulfill current
requirements and is insufficient to meet the demands of fu-
ture economic growth and development.78 The report recom-
mends an increase in capital spending by as much as 100% to
be shared by all levels of government and the private sector. 9
The report also calls for a larger share of the cost to come
from those who benefit from the services.80
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the dilemma posed
by increasing needs for infrastructure concurrent with de-
creasing public funding. Together with the demand for growth
and the need to accommodate it, a great burden has been
placed on the steps of local government.81
The major source of local government revenues are prop-
erty taxes, including the town tax, village tax, fire tax, and
other special assessments.2 Other sources include state reve-
nue sharing and various miscellaneous local fees and
Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754 (1987)(codified
as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-922 (1988)).
76. J. Duncan, T. Morgan & N. Standerfer, Simplifying and Understanding the
Art and Practice of Impact Fees 1 (March 1986)(available from Pace Environmental
Law Review). See also Lamb, supra note 71, at 19.
77. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON AMERICA'S PUB. WORKS, FRAGILE FOUNDATIONS: A RE-
PORT ON AMERICA'S PUBLIC WORKS (1988), reviewed by, Bell, supra note 59, at 13.
78. Bell, supra note 59, at 13.
79. Id. at 15.
80. Id.
81. J. Duncan, T. Morgan & N. Standerfer, supra note 76, at 1. See Lamb, supra
note 71, at 19. See also 2 NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE COMM'N ON STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS,
STATE-LocAL ISSUE BRIEF, ALTERNATIVE REVENUE SOURCES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 1
(Feb. 1989)(all classes of local government now raise at least 70% of their total reve-
nues from their own sources).
82. COST OF COMMUNITY SERVICES STUDY, supra note 26, at 2. Such taxes are gen-
erally levied on an ad valorem basis, or according to property value. Financing
America's Public Infrastructure, supra note 73, at 382. See also BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 51 (6th ed. 1990).
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charges.83 Capital infrastructure projects are mainly financed
with general obligation bonds issued by municipalities and se-
cured by levies on local property taxes.8" As the need for in-
frastructure increases, it is evident that an increase in prop-
erty tax revenues, to secure more bonds, will be warranted.
Presently, however, in most municipalities, such potential tax
hikes are politically unpopular.83
Proponents of new development claim that tax revenues
from such development will expand the local tax base, thereby
reducing the tax rate and the burden on individual taxpay-
ers. 6 However, this has generally not been an accurate as-
sumption. Studies have shown that expenditures for services
to accommodate growth are increasing faster than the addi-
tional increase in the tax base. For example, an analysis of
Hudson Valley towns from 1975 to 1985 showed a 20-25% in-
crease in the tax base (total valuation of taxable property),
while showing a 100-125% increase in town budgets, which in
turn created a 45-75% increase in town tax rates.8 7 Other
83. COST OF COMMUNITY SERVICES STUDY, supra note 26, at 3. Miscellaneous local
revenues include: interest-penalties on taxes, special franchises, clerk's fees, animal
licenses, landfill tickets, recreational fees, interest and earnings, justice revenues, and
garbage disposal fees. Id. at 6.
84. Financing America's Public Infrastructure, supra note 73, at 383. The secur-
ity for all general obligation bonds must be the ability of the municipality to earn, or
to raise by taxation, sufficient funds to pay the interest and principal on its debt. W.
VALENTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 640 (1980).
85. After the recent decision in Albany Area Builders Association v. Town of
Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372, 546 N.E.2d 920, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1989), which invali-
dated a transportation impact fee ordinance, the Town of Guilderland sought to fi-
nance highway improvements through appropriation of a bond and capital notes pro-
gram. The required voter referendum was handily defeated at the polls. and the
highway project has since been canceled. The borrowing plan in the referendum
would have cost taxpayers $44 per household for fifteen years, compared to only $7 if
the impact fee ordinance was upheld. Sanford, Bypass goes down hard, Altamont
Enterprise, Nov. 11, 1989, at 1, col. 3. Similarly, a two billion dollar environmental
bond act, proposed by Governor Cuomo and the New York State Legislature, to pay
for environmental projects, was defeated at the polls on November 6, 1990. Explana-
tion for this loss was attributed to widespread concern for the state's financial condi-
tion. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1990, at B7, col. 5.
86. Hoagland, supra note 69.
87. Id. For example, in the Town of New Windsor, Orange County, which is ex-
periencing rapid commercial and residential growth, the tax base increased 16% while




sources of local government revenues have been unable to
pick up the slack, which is evidenced by municipalities run-
ning close to or at a deficit."8
This ever-widening gap between capital expenditure
needs and limited fiscal resources, compounded further by de-
creasing federal and state allocations and unfavorable re-
sponse to tax increases, is providing impetus for alternative
financing mechanisms at the local government level.89 To this
end, many municipalities have attempted to distribute some
of this burden onto those being accommodated, the develop-
ers, who have created the need for additional municipal ser-
vices.90 Without effective cost-shifting mechanisms, local gov-
ernments bear the principal cost of improvements, while the
developer benefits from subsidies by the general public who,
in reality, are providing the infrastructure assets for the de-
veloper's private enterprise.91
The rationale for shifting these costs was aptly stated by
the court of appeals in Golden v. Planning Board:2 "Every
restriction on the use of property entails hardships for some
individual owners. Those difficulties are invariably the prod-
uct of police regulation and the pecuniary profits of the indi-
vidual must in the long run be subordinated to the needs of
88. COST OF COMMUNITY SERVICES STUDY, supra note 26, at 6. The 1988 town
budget from the Town of North East, Dutchess County, displayed total revenues at
$2,165,191, with total expenditures of $2,331,246; the Town of Beekman, also in
Dutchess County, had a total revenue of $5,241,913, with total expenditures of
$5,197,973. These figures were also broken down by land uses. In North East, reve-
nues from residential uses were $1,607,739, while expenditures for the same uses were
listed as $2,178,523. In Beekman, revenues from residential uses were $4,500,031,
while expenditures were $5,036,152. The latter figures demonstrate that the residen-
tial sector is demanding more in services than it is contributing in revenues. Id. at 7.
89. Morgan, Duncan & McClendon, supra note 7, at 50.
90. See Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 24, at 247.
91. Levy, Impact Fees, Concurrency and Reality: A Proposal for Financing In-
frastructure, 21 URB. LAW. 471, 474 (1989). In effect, developers can also dictate the
infrastructure needs and schedule for construction thereof without consideration of
the local government's willingness or ability to pay for such improvements. Id. See
also Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 24, at 248 (developers reap a windfall since
it is the infrastructure such as schools, recreation facilities, fire protection, etc. that
he sells to his customers).
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the community." 93 The following section analyzes various
cost-shifting, growth-management mechanisms attempted by
New York State municipalities. Included are park land dedi-
cation and in-lieu fees,9' intradevelopment exactions,95 special
improvement districts, 6 sequenced-growth plans with volun-
tary impact fees,97 and impact fee ordinances.98 Each has been
met with varied judicial and legislative response.
VI. Growth Management Mechanisms
"Towns, cities, and villages lack the power to enact or
enforce zoning or land use regulations .... The exercise
of that power, to the extent it is lawful, must be founded
upon a legislative delegation to so proceed, and in the
absence of such a grant will be held ultra vires and
void."9
Expounded by the court of appeals in Golden v. Planning
Board,100 these words have become the proverbial threshold
for local municipalities as they seek justification for growth
management practices to relieve the burden of accommodat-
ing future development. Generally, suburban municipal law-
making authority is found in the Municipal Home Rule
Law 01 and the Statute of Local Governments.1 0 2 Further, the
legislature has delegated a portion of its police power author-
ity for zoning and planning purposes to local governments in
the Town Law,103 and the Village Law.1 04 Unfortunately, in
93. Id. at 381, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
94. See infra notes 107-132 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 133-164 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 165-172 and accompanying text.
98. See infra notes 173-238 and accompanying text.
99. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 369-70, 285 N.E.2d 291, 296, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, 145, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
100. Id. at 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138.
101. See N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1991).
102. See N.Y. STAT. LOCAL GOV'Ts LAW § 10 (McKinney 1969). See also N.Y.
CONST. art. IX, § 1, 2.
103. See N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 261-284 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1991).




these delegations, the state legislature has provided little stat-
utory guidance for addressing many of the emerging issues of
growth management.
Sections 276 and 277 of the Town Law grant town plan-
ning boards the authority to require developers to provide
park land and on-site exactions as prerequisites to subdivision
approval."' 5 Section 190 of the Town Law enables municipali-
ties to create special improvement districts as an alternative
funding and organizational mechanism for capital projects. 10 6
Outside of these explicit and limited provisions, statutory au-
thority for accommodating growth is somewhat general and
vague. This lack of explicit authority has created an arena for
trial-and-error lawmaking, with the state judiciary interpret-
ing and defining the metes and bounds of these local powers.
A. Park Land, In-Lieu Fees, & Exactions
Through Town Law sections 276 and 277, the state legis-
lature has delegated direct authority to town planning boards
for subdivision control." 7 This enables the planning board to
regulate new development through an application and permit
process. This power is vitally important to exurban municipal-
ities where a majority of the land is yet undeveloped. Since
municipalities are subject to the judicially-created mandate
against exclusion,10 8 the permitting authority of sections 276
and 277 cannot be used as a tool to prohibit development.
However, it does enable planning boards to impose certain
conditions on permit approval. Section 276 sets forth the pol-
icy behind this control: "For the purpose of providing for the
future growth and development of the town and affording ad-
equate facilities for the housing, transportation, distribution,
comfort, convenience, safety, health and welfare of its
105. N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 276, 277 (McKinney 1987); accord N.Y. VILLAGE LAW §
7-730 (McKinney 1973).
106. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 190 (McKinney 1987).
107. N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 276, 277 (McKinney 1987). See also Melli, Subdivision
Control in Wisconsin, 1953 Wis. L. REV. 389 (1953) ("Subdivision control, the regula-
tion of the division of raw land into building lots, is a vital component of land-use
control.").
108. See supra notes 33-56 and accompanying text.
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population ... "'01
Section 277 includes the specific conditions that boards
are authorized to exact from permittee developers. 110 To pre-
serve open space and provide for future recreational needs of
the community, developers may be required to show, on their
subdivision plats, available space dedicated to park land."' At
the discretion of the planning board, if suitable land does not
exist on the subdivision plat, it may require the developer to
pay a fee in lieu of park land.1 2 This fee is then placed in a
trust fund to be used exclusively for creation of local parks
within the community.1
Provision of land, or a fee in lieu thereof, has been widely
held a valid condition on subdivision approval in New York., 14
This authority was originally validated by the judiciary in the
court of appeals decision of Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scar-
sdale.115 The park land or in-lieu fee exaction in the Scarsdale
ordinance was based on the enabling authority of former Vil-
lage Law section 179-1,1 which mirrors Town Law section
277. 17 The developer in this case challenged the fee as an un-
authorized tax, claiming the payments were for general gov-
ernment purposes and, therefore, the local government had no
authority to collect such a tax.'18 Ruling the statute constitu-
tional, the court held that such a fee was "not a tax. . . but a
reasonable form of village planning for the general community
109. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 276 (McKinney 1987).
110. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 277 (McKinney 1987).
111. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 277(1) (McKinney 1987).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See generally Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d
673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966); Weingarten v. Town of Lewisboro, 144 Misc. 2d 849,
542 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (Sup. Ct. 1989), aff'd, 160 A.D.2d 668, 559 N.Y.S.2d 807, appeal
dismissed, 76 N.Y.2d 934, 564 N.E.2d 670, 563 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1990); Kessler v. Town of
Shelter Island Planning Bd., 40 A.D.2d 1005, 338 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1972); East Neck
Estates, Ltd. v. Luchsinger, 61 Misc. 2d 619, 305 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
115. 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
116. N.Y. VILLAGE LAW OF 1909 § 179-1, repealed by N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-730
(McKinney 1973).
117. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 277 (McKinney 1987).





More recently, the park land and fee provision of section
277 survived a challenge in the case of Weingarten v. Town of
Lewisboro.120 The New York Supreme Court, Westchester
County, held that the preservation of park land is a legitimate
state interest and that since a subdivision contributes to the
need for more park land, an ordinance created under section
277 substantially advances that interest and is therefore
valid. 121 Relying on the United States Supreme Court decision
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,122 the court
noted that the new standard to be applied in this situation is
more strict, replacing the rational relationship standard of re-
view applied in Jenad. 2  The Weingarten decision was af-
firmed by the appellate division, 124 and a further appeal was
dismissed by the court of appeals. 125
Along with land for parks, section 277(1) also provides
authority to exact on-site improvements from the developer as
a condition on permit approval.1 26 In the alternative, the de-
119. Id. Cf. Gulest Assocs. Inc. v. Town of Newburgh, 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209
N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1960), a/J'd, 15 A.D.2d 815, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1962). In Gul-
est, the appellate division affirmed the invalidation of a statute providing for park
and recreation fees in lieu of dedication of land as a condition to subdivision ap-
proval. The court found the statute permitted a taking of property and was an im-
proper delegation of authority by the state legislature. Id. Gulest was expressly over-
ruled by the court of appeals in Jenad. 18 N.Y.2d at 84, 218 N.E.2d at 675, 271
N.Y.S.2d at 957.
120. 144 Misc. 2d 849, 542 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (Sup. Ct. 1989), aff'd, 160 A.D.2d 668,
559 N.Y.S.2d 807, appeal dismissed, 76 N.Y.2d 934, 564 N.E.2d 670, 563 N.Y.S.2d 60
(1990)(town ordinance imposed a $5,000 per lot fee in lieu of park land).
121. Weingarten, 144 Misc. 2d at 857, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 1017.
122. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). The Supreme Court ruled that a condition imposed on
development must substantially advance legitimate state interests. Id. at 841.
123. Weingarten, 144 Misc. 2d at 857, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 1017. See Jenad, 18
N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966)(discussed supra notes 115-119).
124. 160 A.D.2d 668, 559 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1990).
125. 76 N.Y.2d 934, 564 N.E.2d 670, 563 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1990)(the court of appeals
deferred consideration of this appeal pending the outcome of the remand in the com-
panion case of Bayswater Realty & Capital Corp. v. Planning Bd., 76 N.Y.2d 460, 560
N.E.2d 1300, 560 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1990)).
126. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 277(1) (McKinney 1987)(exactions may include paved
streets, street signs, sidewalks, street lighting standards, curbs, gutters, street trees,
water mains, fire alarm signal devices, sanitary sewers, and storm drains). See also
Connors & High, The Expanding Circle of Exactions: From Dedication to Linkage,
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veloper may post a performance bond with the planning board
sufficient to cover the costs of such improvements, thereby
guaranteeing their provision."
In reviewing the use of section 277 to condition subdivi-
sion approval upon provision of park land, fees in lieu thereof,
and intradevelopment exactions, the courts have generally re-
quired only a reasonable relationship to the community wel-
fare as the standard for validation. 128 The Weingarten deci-
sion may have increased the government's burden regarding
in-lieu fees somewhat. 129 Either way, with such a deferential
and easily met standard, Town Law section 277 is an increas-
ingly important source of cost-shifting authority available to
local governments.
Until recently, this authority was strictly limited only to
the approval of subdivisions. 30 Current trends indicate that
the courts are becoming more willing to extend section 277
50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 70 (1987)("An exaction is essentially a condition of
carrying forward a project in the form of a contribution made by a developer to a
municipality. . . .The most common type of exaction is an intradevelopmental ded-
ication of land for streets, sidewalks, water and sewer lines, and land for recreational
or educational purposes.").
127. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 277(1) (McKinney 1987). See Coates v. Planning Bd., 58
N.Y.2d 800, 802, 445 N.E.2d 642, 643, 459 N.Y.S.2d 259, 260 (1983)("It was reasona-
ble ... in the interest of promoting the health and welfare of the community, to
require that [the developer] provide facilities to insure proper drainage of their prop-
erty as a condition for approval of their subdivision plat."). See also Brous v. Smith,
304 N.Y. 164, 170, 106 N.E.2d 503, 506-07 (1952) (intra-development exactions au-
thorized as "reasonable conditions designed for the protection both of the ultimate
purchasers of the homes and of the public").
128. See id. and text accompanying note 119.
129. See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
130. See Riegert Apartments Corp. v. Planning Bd., 57 N.Y.2d 206, 441 N.E.2d
1076, 455 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1982). The court of appeals held that although a town may
require either land or money in lieu of land for park development as a condition for
approval of a subdivision plat, it may not so condition approval of a site plan. Id. at
211-12, 441 N.E.2d at 1079, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 561. Authority to approve site plans is
located in section 274-a of the Town Law. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 274-a (McKinney 1987).
This section contains no provision for conditioning approval such as section 277. See
also Kamhi v. Planning Bd., 59 N.Y.2d 385, 452 N.E.2d 1193, 465 N.Y.S.2d 865
(1983)(the court refused to extend the authority of section 277 to the approval of
cluster developments which are governed by section 281); Kanaley v. Brennan, 119
Misc. 2d 1003, 1012, 465 N.Y.S.2d 130, 135 (Sup. Ct. 1983)("There is absolutely no
authority under Section 281-a of the Town Law for the acceptance of a cash payment
in lieu of open space for recreational purposes.").
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol8/iss1/7
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authority regarding park land and in-lieu fees to most devel-
opment permit approvals under article 16 of the Town Law,
including site plan and cluster development approvals.13 1
However, this section is limited in that it only shifts lia-
bility for the provision of park land and on-site infrastructure.
The rationale of providing for the community welfare, es-
poused in both Jenad and Weingarten, to justify these exac-
tions, has failed to be successfully applied to conditioning de-
velopment permits on the provisions of off-site capital
improvements.13 2 To meet the demands for these improve-
ments, local governments have relied on the creation of spe-
cial improvement districts.
B. Special Improvement Districts
One way that local revenue may be raised for off-site cap-
ital projects, without burdening the entire municipality with
the cost, is through the creation of special improvement dis-
tricts. Article 12 of the Town Law authorizes the establish-
ment of various districts for the provision of improvements or
services in such district wholly at the expense of the dis-
trict.133 These improvements are funded through special as-
131. See Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 74 N.Y.2d 423, 547 N.E.2d 346, 548
N.Y.S.2d 144 (1989)(the court of appeals held that municipalities may supersede sec-
tion 277 to extend the park land and in-lieu fee condition to approval of site plans
under Town Law section 261). See also Bayswater Realty & Capital Corp. v. Planning
Bd., 76 N.Y.2d 460, 468, 560 N.E.2d 1300, 1304, 560 N.Y.S.2d 623, 627 (1990)(the
court of appeals held that if a planning board makes a determination pursuant to
Town Law section 277(1) that additional recreational land is needed by the town, and
that such need will not be satisfied by open lands created within the plat itself, the
board may demand the substitutional monetary payment pursuant to Town Law sec-
tion 277(1), even though, under the authority of Town Law section 281(b), it is also
requiring the developer to set aside the open lands resulting from the cluster).
132. Cf. 49 Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. 105 (1986)("A town is authorized to require as a
condition of subdivision approval, that a developer contribute toward the costs of
needed firefighting services and facilities. Such a charge constitutes a fee, not a tax.").
133. N.Y. TOWN LAW art. 12, §§ 190 to 208-a (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1991).
Section 190 provides:
[T]he town board of any town may establish or extend in said town a sewer,
drainage, water, water quality treatment, park, public parking, lighting, snow
removal, water supply, sidewalk, a fallout shelter district or refuse and gar-
bage district, aquatic plant growth control district, and in any town bordering
upon or containing within its boundaries any navigable waters of this state, a
1990]
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sessments, or taxes, which are charges levied against real
property particularly and directly benefitted by the local
improvements.'13
Individual districts are established after submission of a
signed petition,"3 5 and a hearing, resolution, and order of the
town board pursuant to the procedures set forth in section
194.16 The petition states the maximum amount proposed to
be expended for the improvements. 37 Expenses are raised for
establishment and improvements within these districts in one
of two ways. The expense of the establishment of a sewer,
sewage disposal, waste-water disposal, drainage, or water-
quality treatment district are to be borne by local assessment
upon the several lots within the district which the board de-
termines are especially benefitted, in proportion to the
amount of benefit which the improvement will confer on it.135
Alternatively, expenses for the establishment of a park, public
parking, water, lighting, snow removal, sidewalk, refuse and
garbage, aquatic plant growth control districts, harbor im-
provement districts, public dock districts, fallout shelter dis-
tricts, or beach improvement districts are to be assessed, lev-
ied, and collected from the several lots within the district for
each purpose in the same manner and at the same time as
other town charges. 139 Such assessments must also proportion-
ately reflect the benefit which each lot will derive
therefrom." 0
However, there are limitations to the district mechanism.
The districts are restricted to specific areas"" and project
harbor improvement district, a public dock district, or beach erosion control
district . ..
Id. § 190.
134. Morgan, Duncan & McClendon, supra note 7, at 51.
135. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 191 (McKinney 1987).
136. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 194 (McKinney 1987).
137. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 191 (McKinney 1987).
138. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 202(2) (McKinney 1987).
139. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 202(3) (McKinney 1987).
140. Id.
141. See Kenwell v. Lee, 261 N.Y. 113, 184 N.E. 692 (1933)(the legality of creat-




types.14 2 Special assessments cannot be levied unless all the
property and property owners within the proposed district are
specially benefitted thereby in a manner differing from the
general public benefit, 43 and all the property and property
owners benefitted are included within the limits of the pro-
posed district. 1 4 Since the creation of a district, and increases
in the maximum amount to be expended therefor, both re-
quire a petition signed by at least fifty percent of the resident
property owners in the district, 45 such mechanisms will be
less popular in times of financial strain.1 4 Further, since a
large portion of these charges are levied on an ad valorem ba-
sis upon current residents of the district, none of the addi-
tional costs created to accommodate new development are
shifted to developers and the future residents.
C. Special Home Rule Request
Article 12 of the Town Law does not provide for the crea-
tion of traffic improvement districts.1 47 However, after the re-
142. There is no provision for districts to raise revenues for schools, highways,
police and fire protection, libraries, and other community services. See N.Y. TOWN
LAW § 190 (McKinney 1987); Kent Dev., Inc. v. Town of North Castle, No. 87-022804,
slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 4, 1988); see also 1986 Op. N.Y. St. Compt. No. 53 (Aug.
13, 1986); 1981 Op. N.Y. St. Compt. No. 353 (Oct. 26, 1981); 34 Op. N.Y. St. Compt.
171 (1978)(there is no authorization for the creation of a highway or road district
similar to a sewer, water, or other district authorized by Town Law section 190).
143. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 194(1)(b) (McKinney 1987). See also Morgan, Duncan &
McClendon, supra note 7, at 51.
144. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 194(1)(c) (McKinney 1987).
145. N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 191, 202-d (McKinney 1987).
146. A Pennsylvania report on the use of transportation districts to raise needed
revenues for roadway improvements noted that the issue of assessing existing residen-
tial development was politically unpopular and would continue to play a limiting fac-
tor in the use of transportation districts. DELAWARE VALLEY PLANNING COMM'N, IMPLE-
MENTATION OF TRANSPORTATION PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA 10-11
(Apr. 1988)(available from the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission, 21
South Fifth Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19106) [hereinafter TRANSPORTATION
PARTNERSHIPS].
147. See supra note 142. Conversely, the New Jersey Legislature recently passed
the New Jersey Transportation Development District Act of 1989 which authorizes
the creation of districts located in high growth areas and the assessment of fees to
pay for transportation improvements within these districts. N.J. Transportation De-
velopment District Act of 1989, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 27:1C-1 to -18 (West Supp. 1990);
see also Transportation Partnership Act, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 1621-1626
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cent invalidation of the Armonk Traffic/Roadway Improve-
ment Impact Area (ATRIIA), 45 the Town of North Castle
petitioned the New York State Legislature for special ena-
bling legislation to create a traffic improvement facilitation
district.14 9 Under article 5, section 40 of the Municipal Home
Rule Law, local governments are presented with the opportu-
nity to make a home rule request to the state legislature for a
"specific bill relating to the property, affairs or government of
such local government which does not in terms and in effect
apply alike to all [other municipalities]. . . ."15 Such a bill
was drafted, submitted, and the state legislature created the
Town of North Castle Development Facilitation Improvement
District by statute on July 16, 1989.11 The law authorizes the
town to appropriate, collect, and expend money for the recon-
struction and improvement of the district highway system and
local roads. 16 2 The procedural provisions to be followed are
similar to those set forth in Town Law article 12.113 The costs
of the improvements are to be raised through the imposition
of fees upon all lots and parcels within the district in propor-
tion to the benefit derived therefrom.6 4 This assessment ap-
(Purdon Supp. 1990).
148. Kent Dev., Inc. v. Town of North Castle, No. 87-022804, slip op. (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Nov. 4, 1988)(discussed infra notes 185-191 and accompanying text).
149. North Castle Traffic Impact Fee Legislation Passes Legislature, Impact,
Aug. 1989, at 8, col. 1.
150. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 40 (McKinney 1969). Section 40 states:
The elective or appointive chief executive officer ... with the concurrence of
the legislative body of such local government, or the legislative body by a
vote of two-thirds of its total voting power without the approval of such of-
ficer, may request the legislature to pass a specific bill relating to the prop-
erty, affairs or government of such local government which does not in terms
and in effect apply alike to all counties .... all cities, all towns or all villages,
as the case may be. Every such request shall declare that a necessity exists
for the passage of such bill by the legislature and shall recite the facts estab-
lishing such necessity.
Id. Authority for this provision is found in N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
151. 1989 N.Y. Laws ch. 452.
152. Id. § 1.
153. Id. See also N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 190 to 208-a (McKinney 1987 & Supp.
1991).





plies to both existing and new development. 155 However, this
special legislation contains certain unique provisions.
First, the act permits the establishment of an escrow ac-
count for the improvement funds to be controlled by the mu-
nicipality.156 This account is to be held in trust solely for the
purpose of financing and paying the costs and expenses attrib-
utable to the district improvements."5 7
Second, to determine the fees or assessments, based on
derived benefit, the board is to take into account which par-
cels significantly contribute to the traffic congestion to be
remedied by the improvements.1 58 This provision grants broad
discretionary authority to the town board. If this district is
created in an area facing new development pressures, it would
seem that the planning board has the discretion to apportion
a greater charge on the new development, as contributing sig-
nificantly more of the problem to be alleviated through dis-
trict funding, than existing residents. It is also interesting to
note that the intended purpose of ATRIIA, which was origi-
nally declared invalid by the courts, and then later served as
the basis for this special state legislation, was to impose an
"impact fee" on all new commercial and multi-family develop-
ment. 15 Use of the special home rule request mechanism may
have created a way around the invalidation of roadway impact
fee ordinances. It remains to be seen how the Town of North
Castle will proportion the fees and how much of a burden new
development will incur.
Comparable special state legislation was also enacted at
the request of the Town of Greenburgh, Westchester
County,6 0 the Town of South East, Putnam County,' 1 and
155. 1989 N.Y. Laws ch. 452. "The costs and expenses ... shall be raised
through levy of special assessments upon all lots . . . within such improvement dis-
trict .... " Id. § 1.
156. 1989 N.Y. Laws ch. 452, § 5.
157. Id.
158. Id. § 2.
159. See Kent Dev., Inc. v. Town of North Castle, No. 87-022804, slip op. at 15-
16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 4, 1988).
160. 1984 N.Y. Laws ch. 723.
161. 1990 N.Y. Laws ch. 571.
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the Town of Ulster, Ulster County.'62 If a trend in this area
develops, the New York State Legislature may be compelled
to amend article 12 of the Town Law' 63 in order to set uni-
form standards and procedures.1 6 4
D. Growth/Improvement Sequencing
Town Law section 261 delegates the state's police power
authority, in the area of zoning, to local municipalities.165 This
section permits town planning boards to create local ordi-
nances to restrict and regulate population density and the
size, location, and use of buildings and land for the purpose of
promoting the health and welfare of the community. 66
This authority was creatively applied as a growth man-
agement tool by the Town of Ramapo. As noted in Section III,
in the case of Golden v. Planning Board,'6 7 the New York
Court of Appeals validated the town's use of section 261 to
create a zoning ordinance that timed subdivision approval
with the availability of necessitated public facilities. 66 As a
result, the town was able to slow the pace of growth and de-
velopment to allow the concurrent provision of necessary mu-
nicipal services and infrastructure. 1 9
As in Golden, where the ordinance was directly linked to
an eighteen-year capital improvement schedule, such a device
162. 1990 N.Y. Laws ch. 521.
163. Just such an amendment was introduced in the legislature in 1989, but
failed to gain support. S. 5150, 1989 N.Y. St. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1989).
164. Moriarty v. Planning Bd., 119 A.D.2d 188, 192, 506 N.Y.S.2d 184, 186-87
(1986)(through enactment of Town Law section 274-a, the state legislature repealed
the piecemeal legislative authority granted municipalities to regulate site plan ap-
provals), appeal denied, 69 N.Y.2d 603, 504 N.E.2d 396, 512 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1987).
165. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261 (McKinney 1987); accord N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-700
(McKinney 1973). See McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 111 Misc. 2d 1046, 1057, 445
N.Y.S.2d 859, 867 (1981)("[P]olice power resides within the state and is delegated by
it, insofar as zoning is concerned, to the town."), aff'd as modified on other grounds,
105 A.D.2d 46, 482 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1984), aft'd, 66 N.Y.2d 544, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 498
N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985).
166. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261 (McKinney 1987).
167. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 1003 (1972)(discussed supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text).





may effectuate an authorized moratorium on development. 17 0
This authority must necessarily be inferred from the Town
Law since the imposition of a moratorium on development is
nowhere mentioned in the statute. Left unanswered by cases
like Golden and Charles v. Diamond, however, is the issue of
what length of time constitutes a valid, reasonably limited, or
temporary moratorium.'17
Interestingly, the Ramapo plan provided developers with
an alternative to bypass the moratorium. Developers were
permitted to accelerate permit approval by providing funds
for the required municipal facilities. 172 In effect, this provision
created a voluntary impact fee which was upheld by the New
York Court of Appeals.
Slowing the pace of development, through a plan such as
the one in Ramapo, enables towns to spread the cost of pro-
viding additional services over time. However, aside from the
170. Id. See also Charles v. Diamond, 41 N.Y.2d 318, 324, 360 N.E.2d 1295, 1300,
392 N.Y.S.2d 594,599 (1977)("The municipal power to act in furtherance of the public
health and welfare may justify a moratorium on building permits or sewer attach-
ments which are reasonably limited as to time."). See supra notes 62-66 and accom-
panying text.
171. "Temporary restraints necessary to promote the over-all public interest are
permissible. Permanent interference with the reasonable use of private property for
the purpose for which it is suited is not." Charles v. Diamond, 41 N.Y.2d at 324, 360
N.E.2d at 1300, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
Remedial action aimed at environmental problems caused by excessive growth
may also effect development moratoria. For example, a recent federally-sponsored
study of the degradation of the water quality of Long Island Sound has determined
that excessive nutrients from sewage treatment plant discharges are the major con-
tributing factor. LONG ISLAND SOUND STUDY, STATUS REPORT AND INTERIM ACTIONS FOR
HYPOXIA MANAGEMENT 10 (Dec. 1990). It was also disclosed that most of the sewage
treatment plants in the Sound's watershed are at or over capacity, and that this is
due to the extensive growth and development in these areas. Id. at 27. In attempts to
slow the degradation of the Sound, the study recommends setting baseline amounts
of nutrient discharges from the sewage treatment plants. Plants would be held to this
limit by state enforcement. Id. at 34. As a result of this limit, plants would not be
able to accept further hookups into the sewer system unless the plant was expanded
or retrofitted in order to maintain its maximum nutrient discharge limit. For many
municipalities that cannot immediately afford expansion costs, this would effectuate
a development moratorium until such time as they can finance improvements. How-
ever, this only stops development. It does not create a means to raise the revenue
that will eventually be required to accommodate it.
172. Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 369, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
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possible voluntary acceleration fee, it still does not shift any
of the fiscal responsibility for municipal services away from
the general tax revenues, and only prolongs the inevitable.
E. Impact Fees
It has been demonstrated up to this point that the provi-
sion of infrastructure for new development has become an
uniquely local and burdensome responsibility. The most con-
troversial, yet direct mechanism municipalities have enlisted
for assistance in the financing of local infrastructure is the im-
pact fee ordinance. Such ordinances direct, as a condition on
permit approval, that the developer pay a specified fee to help
fund off-site infrastructure. 73 The fees have been used to fi-
nance roadways, water and sewer facilities, drainage, fire and
police protection, affordable housing, and other public ser-
vices and facilities. 74 The commonly espoused theories for
justifying such charges are that "[n]ew development should
contribute its fair share of the costs of providing new facilities
necessary to accommodate said new development"'175 and "ex-
isting residents should not be required to subsidize growth.' 7
Use of the impact fee is fast becoming a viable and popular
alternative for municipalities throughout the country. 177
Implementation of impact fee ordinances has been met
by legal challenge. Three recurring obstacles' 78 to impact fee
validity which have formed the basis for many challenges in-
clude: whether there is statutory authority to create the im-
pact fee ordinance, 79 whether the fee effectuates a tax rather
173. See Connors & High, supra note 126, at 71-72 ("Impact fees are charges
levied by local government against new development in order to generate revenue for
capital funding necessitated by the new development.").
174. REGIONWIDE ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, at 1.
175. Town of Guilderland, N.Y., Local Law No. 2, Transportation Impact Fee
Law (June 2, 1987).
176. REGIONWIDE ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, at 6.
177. Municipalities in over thirty-nine states impose development impact assess-
ments of one kind or another. Issues in Focus: Impact Fees in New York - Back to
the Drawing Board, Senate Res. Serv. (N.Y. St. Senate) No. 36, at 2 (Jan. 16, 1990).
178. See Steinman, supra note 21.
179. See infra notes 183-238 and accompanying text. See also New Jersey Build-




than a regulation,180 and whether the ordinance effects an un-
constitutional taking or violates equal protection or due pro-
cess rights. s1
The creation of impact fee ordinances has received a less
than favorable response by the courts in New York State. '
(1987)(in invalidating an ordinance that allocated the cost of road improvement be-
tween the township and developers, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the
state legislature "has not delegated to municipalities the far-reaching power to depart
from traditionally authorized methods of financing public facilities so as to allocate
the cost of substantial public projects among new developments on the basis of their
anticipated impact"). Cf. Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Township of Holmdel, 121 N.J.
550, 583 A.2d 277 (1990)(the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that mandatory devel-
opment fees constituted a proper municipal exercise of the police power, however, the
court held that such ordinances would be invalid absent specific statutory authority
delegated by the state).
180. Compare City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So. 2d 363 (Ala.
1978)(in-lieu fee is a tax and therefore must have specific statutory authorization)
and Eastern Diversified Properties, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 319 Md. 45, 570 A.2d
850 (1990)(impact fee imposed as a condition on building permit approval was a tax
which the county lacked authority to impose) with Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale,
18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966) (in-lieu fee is not a tax but a
valid regulation under the police power). See also Contractors & Builders Ass'n v.
City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 318 (Fla. 1976) (the criterion used by the Florida
Supreme Court to distinguish a regulation from a tax was whether the amount spent
by the town was greater than the amounts collected from the developments creating
the need for the additional facilities); Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Township of
Holmdel, 121 N.J. 550, 583 A.2d 277 (1990) (development fees are a form of inclusio-
nary zoning and thus are regulatory measures and not taxes). See generally Stein-
man, supra note 21; Keenan, supra note 21.
181. Standards of judicial review regarding the constitutionality of impact fees
have ranged from whether the exaction is "specifically and uniquely attributable to,"
to "rationally related to," state interests. Compare Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v.
Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 380, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1961)(regarding
fee payment requirements for educational and recreational purposes: "[I]f the burden
cast upon the subdivider is 'specifically and uniquely attributable to' his activity,
then the requirement is permissible; if not, it is forbidden and amounts to a confisca-
tion of private property in contravention of the constitutional prohibitions rather
than reasonable regulation under the police power.") with Russ Bldg. Partnership v.
City of San Francisco, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1496, 1503, 246 Cal. Rptr. 21, 24
(1987)(transit fee ordinance was held to impose a "debatably rational" fee and there-
fore valid). See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 43 U.S. 825, 841 (1987)(to de-
feat a takings claim the condition imposed upon development must "substantially
advance" state interest).
182. See generally Albany Area Builders Ass'n v. Town of Guilderland, 74
N.Y.2d 372, 546 N.E.2d 920, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1989); Coconato v. Town of Esopus,
152 A.D.2d 39, 547 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1989); Kent Dev., Inc. v. Town of North Castle, No.
87-022804, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 4, 1988).
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However, impact fees have yet to be specifically outlawed as a
potentially viable growth management tool. In reviewing chal-
lenges to local fee ordinances, the New York courts have re-
fused to venture beyond the issue of statutory authority. 183
Under the New York State Constitution, a municipality
may not enact local legislation inconsistent with either the
provisions of the state constitution or with any general state
law, unless such authority is expressly conferred by the legis-
lature. 184 The Supreme Court of New York, Westchester
County, relied on this "express authority" provision to invali-
date a resolution creating an impact fee for road improve-
ments in Kent Development, Inc. v. Town of North Castle. 8
In response to the pressures of expanding growth and de-
velopment, and the inevitable detrimental impact it would
have on existing roads, the Town of North Castle developed a
traffic improvement district.188 By resolution, the planning
board created the Armonk Traffic/Roadway Improvement Im-
pact Area.'8 The intended purpose of the district was to fi-
nance the planning, design, and construction of roadway im-
provements within a specific area. 88  As part of the
implementation of ATRIIA, the resolution required, as a con-
dition on site plan approval, the payment of an impact fee to
help defray costs for roadway improvements in the designated
area. 
9
Reviewing municipal authority to impose fees as a condi-
tion for site plan approval, the court held to a strict interpre-
tation of the Town Law. Section 274-a of the Town Law dele-
gates to the town planning board the power over site plan
approvals.'90 Nothing in this section expressly authorizes the
183. See Steinman, supra note 21. See generally Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372,
546 N.E.2d 920, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1989).
184. N.Y. CONsT. art. IX, § 2(c).
185. No. 87-022804, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 4, 1988).
186. Id. at 15.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 16.
189. Id. "All new office, commercial and multifamily residential development
projects containing in excess of 2500 square feet of gross floor area are required to
pay an 'impact fee'...." Id. at 15-16.




imposition of an impact fee. The court found that in New
York, courts have repeatedly refused to extend authority
under the Town Law enabling legislation to impose fees be-
yond Section 277.11'
Limited authority for general local lawmaking has been
conferred upon New York municipalities through the Munici-
pal Home Rule Law (MHR).19 ' The MHR was developed
under the 1964 amendments to article IX of the New York
State Constitution for the purpose of establishing effective lo-
cal governance. 193 Provisions of the MHR statute are to be
"liberally construed. "19 The general lawmaking authority of
the statute is found in article 2, section 10.195 This section af-
firmatively grants authority to towns to adopt and amend lo-
cal laws pertaining to its property, affairs, and government,
provided such laws are "not inconsistent with the other provi-
sions of the constitution or ... any general law . ... ",,16
The MHR consistency requirement is an effective obsta-
cle to the use of this authority in the area of development per-
mit approvals. Town Law sections 274, 277, and 281 respec-
(McKinney Supp. 1991).
191. Kent Dev., No. 87-022804, slip. op. at 19. See supra notes 130-131 and ac-
companying text. See also Riegert Apartments Corp. v. Planning Bd., 57 N.Y.2d 206,
212, 441 N.E.2d 1076, 1079, 455 N.Y.S.2d 558, 561 (1982)(the court of appeals specifi-
cally held that although a town may require that before approving a subdivision plan,
either land or money in lieu of land be delivered to the municipality, no such condi-
tion may be imposed on approval of a site plan).
However, a new trend is developing from the courts in regard to park land dedi-
cations, and fees in lieu thereof, which contradicts this strict interpretation. See
Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 74 N.Y.2d 423, 547 N.E.2d 346, 548 N.Y.S.2d 144
(1989)(the Municipal Home Rule supersession authority may be used to create local
law inconsistent with the Town Law under certain circumstances). See infra notes
199-218 and accompanying text. See also Bayswater Realty & Capital Corp. v. Plan-
ning Bd., 76 N.Y.2d 460, 560 N.E.2d 1300, 560 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1990)(extension of sec-
tion 277 fee requirements to the permitting of cluster developments under section 281
considered valid in order to further the objectives of the framers of the Town Law).
192. N.Y. MUN. HoME RULE LAW §§ 1-59 (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1991).
193. N.Y. CoNsT. art. IX, § 2. See Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 74 N.Y.2d 423,
428, 547 N.E.2d 346, 348, 548 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (1989).
194. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 51 (McKinney 1969). See Kamhi, 74 N.Y.2d
at 428, 547 N.E.2d at 348, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
195. N.Y. MUN. HoME RULE LAW § 10(1)(i) (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1991).
196. Id. See generally Consolidated Edison Co. v. Town of Red Hook, 60 N.Y.2d
99, 456 N.E.2d 487, 468 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1983).
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tively regulate site plan, subdivision, and cluster development
approvals.1 97 Only section 277 provides for imposition of a
fee. 198 As a result, any ordinance generally created under
MHR section 10, imposing impact fees as a condition on per-
mit approval, will be inconsistent with the Town Law provi-
sions and therefore presumptively invalid.
However, MHR section 10 contains an exception to the
consistency requirement. The exception is located in section
10(1)(ii)(d)(3) and is known as the "supersession author-
ity."1 99 This authority permits a town to supersede, 00 in its
local application, "any provision of the town law relating to
the property, affairs or government of the town or to other
matters in relation to which and to the extent to which it is
authorized to adopt local laws by this section ... ."201 Incon-
sistency is a necessary premise to use of the supersession
authority.20 2
There are restrictions on the use of this authority. The
most fundamental limitation is that of preemption.03 The su-
persession authority will not be permitted where the state leg-
islature has expressly prohibited the adoption of such a law, 04
or has evidenced its intent to occupy the field. 05 The super-
session authority is also not effective when relating to a spe-
197. N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 274, 277, 281 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1991).
198. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 277 (McKinney 1987).
199. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(d)(3) (McKinney 1969 & Supp.
1991). See Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 74 N.Y.2d 423, 429, 547 N.E.2d 346, 349, 548
N.Y.S.2d 144, 147 (1989).
200. Supersede is defined as "to set aside, annul, replace, make void, inefficacious
or useless. ... BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1437 (6th ed. 1990).
201. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(d)(3) (McKinney 1969 & Supp.
1991). See Kamhi, 74 N.Y.2d at 429-30, 547 N.E.2d at 349, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 147. See
also Sherman v. Frazier, 84 A.D.2d 401, 446 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1982).
202. Kamhi, 74 N.Y.2d at 430, 547 N.E.2d at 349, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
203. Albany Area Builders Ass'n v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372, 377, 546
N.E.2d 920, 922, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (1989)(citing Dougal v. County of Suffolk, 65
N.Y.2d 668, 481 N.E.2d 254, 491 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1985)).
204. Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d at 377, 546 N.E.2d at 922, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 629. See
also Lansdowne Entertainment Corp. v. New York City Dep't of Consumer Affairs,
74 N.Y.2d 761, 543 N.E.2d 725, 545 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1989).
205. Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d at 377, 546 N.E.2d at 922, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 629. See
also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Town of Red Hook, 60 N.Y.2d 99, 456 N.E.2d 487,




cial improvement district or improvement area,2°1 creation or
alteration of areas of taxation, authorization or abolition of
mandatory and permissive referenda, or town finances as pro-
vided in article 8 of the Town Law.10 7
Recently, some life was blown into the lungs of the "su-
persession authority," and its use in growth management, by
the New York State Court of Appeals decision in Kamhi v.
Town of Yorktown.2 °0 The Town of Yorktown enacted a local
law in 1982 which required payment of a recreation fee as a
condition of site plan approval.09 In the ensuing constitu-
tional challenge to the law, the appellate division ruled it in-
valid under similar rationale as that used in Riegert Apart-
ments and Kent Development.'0
After reviewing the case, the court of appeals affirmed the
appellate division's invalidation of the law.2"1 However, the
court strayed from the strict express authority rationale and
focused the majority of its opinion on the MHR "supersession
authority.21 12 The court noted that outside the restrictions on
the use of this authority, "the Legislature has recognized that
situations may arise where laws of State-wide application are
appropriately tailored by municipalities to fit their own pecu-
liarly local needs. 21 13
The court reasoned that the purpose of the Yorktown or-
dinance was within this "peculiarly local needs" category.21
Condominiums, the type of development at issue, generally do
206. This restriction invalidated the use of the MHR by the Town of North Cas-
tle to justify the creation of ATRIIA. Kent Dev., Inc. v. Town of North Castle, No.
87-022804, slip op. at 22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 4, 1988).
207. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(d)(3) (McKinney 1969 & Supp.
1991).
208. 74 N.Y.2d 423, 547 N.E.2d 346, 548 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1989), aff'g, 141 A.D.2d
607, 529 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1988).
209. Town of Yorktown, N.Y., Local Law No. 6 (1982).
210. Kamhi, 141 A.D.2d at 609, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 530. See supra note 130 and
accompanying text. The appellate division in Kamhi also ruled that the local law was
not authorized under the MHR as inconsistent with Town Law section 274-a. 141
A.D.2d at 609, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 530.
211. 74 N.Y.2d at 426, 547 N.E.2d at 347, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
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not require subdivision approval under sections 276 and
277.15 As a result, condominiums are exempt from the park
land and fee provisions.2"' Without the Yorktown ordinance,
park land, or fees in lieu thereof, could not be collected from
condominium developers. Yet, because of condominium devel-
opment, the demand for park land is increased, and the bur-
den to provide for this demand falls back on the local munici-
pality, with the developer receiving a free ride.2"
Recognizing this situation, the court found that to permit
"the Town to supersede Town Law section 274-a in its local
application, so that the purpose of the statute will be pro-
moted rather than defeated within this community, fits com-
fortably within section 10" of the Municipal Home Rule
Law.21 '8 This rationale created an enticing potential for use of
the supersession authority in the area of local impact fee ordi-
nances. However, this potential was immediately curtailed by
the court of appeals in its same day decision in Albany Area
Builders Association v. Town of Guilderland2 1 9
Guilderland presented the classic impact fee challenge.
The challenge came in response to the enactment, by the
Town of Guilderland, of a transportation impact fee law
(TIFL).2 20 The ordinance required all applicants for building
permits within the town, whose projects would generate addi-
tional traffic, to pay an impact fee at the time the permit was
215. See Gerber v. Town of Clarkstown, 78 Misc. 2d 221, 223, 356 N.Y.S.2d 926,
928 (Sup. Ct. 1974)(a condominium is not a subdivision, and section 276, permitting
town planning boards to review subdivisions, does not apply).
216. Id. See also 34 Op. N.Y. St. Compt. 154 (1978).
217. Kamhi, 74 N.Y.2d at 432, 547 N.E.2d at 350, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
218. Id. at 432, 547 N.E.2d at 351, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
After such an extensive explanation of the available Municipal Home Rule Law
powers for the Town of Yorktown, the court was still compelled to sustain the appel-
late division's invalidation of the local law. The town board failed to enact the local
law in conformance with the formalities specified in section 22(1) of the MHR, which
requires the municipality to state its intention to supersede with "definiteness and
explicitness." Id. at 434, 547 N.E.2d at 352, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 150; see N.Y. MUN. HOME
RULE LAW § 22(1) (McKinney 1969).
219. 74 N.Y.2d 372, 546 N.E.2d 920, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1989).
220. Town of Guilderland, N.Y., Local Law No. 2, Transportation Impact Fee
Law (June 2, 1987); Albany Area Builders Ass'n v. Town of Guilderland, 141 A.D.2d




granted.221 The fees, which were placed in a trust fund, were
to be used exclusively for the purpose of financing capital im-
provements and expansion of roads and transportation facili-
ties within the town.2 2 All of the typical constitutional chal-
lenges were raised. The law was challenged for lack of
statutory authority, as exceeding the local police power au-
thority of the town by impacting surrounding communities,
effectuating an illegal tax on a small number of homeowners,
and regulating in an area preempted by state law.223 The Su-
preme Court, Appellate Division, held that the MHR and
state constitution did not confer authority upon the town to
adopt such a law, and that the law was inconsistent and pre-
empted by general laws regulating highway funding and mu-
nicipal finance.224 Municipalities across the state anxiously
awaited the court of appeals' decision, anticipating a defini-
tive ruling on the overall constitutionality of the use of impact
fees in New York.226
However, the court of appeals, in its decision to affirm the
appellate division and invalidate the ordinance, failed to ad-
dress the constitutional issues beyond the lack of statutory
authority. Following the rationale of its decision in Kamhi,
the court found TIFL clearly "inconsistent" with the Town
Law.226 This made the issue ripe for a MHR supersession
claim.2 27 In defending its authority to enact TIFL, the town
brought to issue its supersession authority under the MHR.228
Relying on Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown,229 the court of ap-
peals held that the Town of Guilderland lacked supersession
authority to enact TIFL because the area of roadway im-
provements financing was preempted by several provisions of
221. 141 A.D.2d at 295, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 229, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
225. Spencer, Town Granted Broad Power Over Development, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 27,
1989, at 1, col. 3.
226. Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d at 376, 546 N.E.2d at 921, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 628.
227. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(d)(3) (McKinney 1969 & Supp.
1991).
228. 74 N.Y.2d at 377, 546 N.E.2d at 922, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
229. 74 N.Y.2d 423, 547 N.E.2d 346, 548 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1989).
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the Town Law and State Highway Law.230 The court noted
that preemption is a fundamental restriction on the use of the
MHR supersession authority. 31 Concluding that this area was
comprehensively regulated, the court stated:
The purpose, number and specificity of these statutes
make clear that the State perceived no real distinction
between the particular needs of any one locality and other
parts of the State with respect to the funding of roadway
improvements .... [T]herefore . . . the State has evi-
denced a purpose and design to preempt the subject of
roadway funding and occupy the entire field, so as to pro-
hibit additional local regulation.2 3
The court also noted that legislative intent to preempt need
not be express, but may be implied from the "nature of the
subject matter being regulated and the purpose and scope of
the State legislative scheme ....
The fear of many impact fee proponents, that the ramifi-
cations of the Guilderland preemption ruling would extend to
other uses of impact fee ordinances, was realized shortly
thereafter by the appellate division opinion in Coconato v.
Town of Esopus.23 The court invalidated an ordinance which
required all new customers of a local water district to pay an
initial hookup fee to be used solely for capital development
within the district. 35 Citing Guilderland, authority under the
MHR was rejected as the court found that "[a]rticle 12 and
12-A of the Town Law establish a comprehensive scheme for
financing water district improvements manifesting the legisla-
230. N.Y. ToWN LAw art. 8, §§ 100-125 (McKinney 1987)(article 8 of the Town
Law establishes an elaborate and comprehensive "budget system" to regulate town
finances).
N.Y. HIGH. LAw art. 10, §§ 260-292 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1991)(article 10 of
the Highway Law establishes regulations pertaining specifically to financing highway
projects within the state).
231. Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d at 377, 546 N.E.2d at 922, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
232. Id. at 378-79, 546 N.E.2d at 923, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
233. Id. at 377, 546 N.E.2d at 922, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
234. 152 A.D.2d 39, 547 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1989), motion for leave to appeal denied,
76 N.Y.2d 701, 557 N.E.2d 1187, 558 N.Y.S.2d 891 (1990).




ture's intent to preempt the area of financing capital improve-
ments to town water districts. 2 36
Similar to Guilderland, article 12, when combined with
the article 8 budget system, creates an effective bar to the use
of impact fees pertaining to improvement districts.37 As a re-
sult of the Guilderland decision, the reliance of towns on the
MHR to authorize impact fee legislation is evidently barred
by preemption. Of course, the only way around preemption is
express statutory authority.
With the holdings of Guilderland and Coconato this anal-
ysis of local government authority has come full circle to the
earlier premise: "Towns, cities, and villages lack the power to
enact and enforce zoning or other land use regulations ...
The exercise of that power, to the extent it is lawful, must be
founded upon a legislative delegation to so proceed, and in the
absence of such a grant will be held ultra vires and void. s28
F. Guilderland Postscript: "[W]e have to cut back on
growth. "2 3 9
It is interesting to note the effect that the court of ap-
peals decision has had on the Town of Guilderland. Robert
Mitchell, president of the Albany Area Builders Association,
the group which brought the suit against the town, argued
against the impact fee by stating, "'[T]he fee was just a ploy
to avoid raising taxes in town.' ,240 Town of Guilderland Su-
pervisor, Kevin Moss, replied, "'There is no question that
that is what we were trying to do.' "241
236. Id. at 42-43, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
237. In Guilderland, article 8 was combined with the State Highway Law to pre-
empt the field of roadway financing. 74 N.Y.2d at 377, 546 N.E.2d at 922, 547
N.Y.S.2d at 629.
238. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 369-70, 285 N.E.2d 291, 296, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, 145, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
239. Statement of Town of Guilderland Supervisor Kevin Moss in response to
the defeat of the referendum to finance town highway improvements. Sanford, Moss
set to counter bypass failure with lot restrictions, Altamont Enterprise, Nov. 16,
1989, at 1, col. 3.
240. Sanford, Thumbs down on impact fees, Altamont Enterprise, Nov. 2, 1989,
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The impact fee ordinance in the Town of Guilderland
raised $830,000 in fees and interest before it was invalidated
by the court of appeals."42 The majority of these funds were to
be used for construction of an additional highway to relieve
the town's traffic congestion aggravated by increased develop-
ment.248 In addition to the impact fees collected, the highway
improvements would have cost the town's taxpayers approxi-
mately $7 per household.4 With the invalidation of the ordi-
nance, most of the $830,000 is to be returned to the develop-
ers.245 The invalidation has also placed the entire burden of
paying for the improvements back on the taxpayer. This
translates into an increase in the tax per household from $7 to
$44.246 Opposed to increased taxes, the town's taxpayers voted
down the ensuing referendum to finance the highway im-
provements through town borrowing, which would effect the
tax increase.247 Town Supervisor Moss commented on the
town's plight:
"As a result of the Bypass defeat, we have been put in a
position where no new roads will be built because devel-
opers have refused to pay for it, and the Court of Appeals
says we can't make them pay for it. The residents don't
want to pay for a new road, so we have to cut back ongrowth" . . . .24
Moss indicated that the town will seek to rezone, increasing
the minimum lot sizes for new homes to be built in the
town.2 49 "[Tihe choices are to either 'allow roads to clog with
traffic or restrict growth more severely than we have in the
past. . . . There is only so much a local government can
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Sanford, Bypass goes down hard, Altamont Enterprise, Nov. 9, 1989, at 1,
col. 3.
245. Thumbs down on impact fees, supra note 240.
246. Bypass goes down hard, supra note 244.
247. Id.
248. Moss set to counter bypass failure with lot restrictions, supra note 239.
249. Sanford, Town takes another tack to pay for roads, Altamont Enterprise,





Once again, as towns like Guilderland run out of options
in trying to accommodate growth and development, they will
be forced to revert to moratoria and other exclusionary zoning
practices to slow or even stop development. It is likely that
such practices will spur additional lawsuits by developers as
local government trial-and-error zoning practices continue
without guidance from the state legislature.
G. Summary Analysis
The foregoing analysis of growth management mecha-
nisms demonstrates just how little control local governments
have over managing growth and development. While it is con-
trary to the public health, safety, and welfare for development
to proceed more rapidly than the public infrastructure, it is
also contrary to popular logic to impose higher taxes upon ex-
isting users to finance the capital improvements that service
new development.2 51
The response of the courts and state legislature to local
efforts to cope with this problem is fraught with inconsis-
tency. The court of appeals validated the conditioning of sub-
division approval upon the payment of a fee to be used for the
creation and maintenance of park land.252 These fees accom-
modate not only the subdivision, but the present and future
needs of the town or broader community.2 53 The court held
that such a fee substantially advanced state interests2 54 and
was a reasonable form of planning for the general community
good.255 The court has even gone as far as extending this au-
250. Statement of Kevin Moss, Town Supervisor. Moss set to counter bypass
failure with lot restrictions, supra note 239.
251. Nicholas, supra note 27, at 87.
252. Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966). See supra notes 114-125 and accompanying text.
253. Bayswater Realty & Capital Corp. v. Planning Bd., 76 N.Y.2d 460, 469, 560
N.E.2d 1300, 1305, 560 N.Y.S.2d 623, 628 (1990).
254. Weingarten v. Town of Lewisboro, 144 Misc. 2d 849, 857, 542 N.Y.S.2d
1012, 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1989), af'd, 160 A.D.2d 668, 559 N.Y.S.2d 807, appeal dis-
missed, 76 N.Y.2d 934, 564 N.E.2d 670, 563 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1990).
255. Jenad, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
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thority beyond section 277, to the conditioning of site plan266
and cluster development approvals,8 7 under the rationale that
to do so would further the objectives of the framers of the
Town Law.2 8
However, the same court invalidated the traffic impact
fee law of the Town of Guilderland. "9 Undoubtedly, the Town
Board of Guilderland believed that collection of such fees was
reasonably in the best interests of the community and the
state. The court did not refute this. The key difference was
the presence of legislative authority. Whereas the state legis-
lature explicitly enables local municipalities to impose in-lieu
fees for park land in Town Law section 277, no such explicit
authority exists for off-site roadway improvements, or for that
matter, any other type of off-site improvement.
Interestingly enough, there is also no express statutory
authority to impose- development moratoria. However, the
court of appeals has held that ordinances such as those chal-
lenged in Golden v. Planning Board2 60 and Charles v. Dia-
mond, a1 which effect moratoria, are valid local zoning prac-
tices authorized under the municipal police power.26 2 The only
restriction is that the ordinances reasonably promote the
overall public interest.2 3
The court never did define what was meant by a reasona-
ble or temporary moratorium. Yet, it seems that eighteen
years, as was the potential with the Ramapo plan, did not cre-
ate an unreasonable restraint on development. Ironically, such
delay seems contrary to the court's non-exclusion mandate.2 ",
256. Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 74 N.Y.2d 423, 547 N.E.2d 346, 548 N.Y.S.2d
144 (1989).
257. Bayswater Realty, 149 A.D.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1989), affd as modi-
fied, 76 N.Y.2d 460, 560 N.E.2d 1300, 560 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1990).
258. Id. at 56, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 618.
259. Albany Area Builders Ass'n v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372, 546
N.E.2d 920, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1989).
260. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 1003 (1972).
261. 41 N.Y.2d 318, 360 N.E.2d 1295, 392 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1977).
262. Id. at 324, 360 N.E.2d at 1300, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
263. Id.




Further, the court in Golden considered valid the provi-
sion by which a developer could buy his way out of the mora-
torium by providing the municipality with the necessary pub-
lic facilities.265 In light of the potential for an eighteen-year
moratorium, this voluntary impact fee implies a coerciveness
that resembles the mandatory impact fee which the present
court of appeals finds no local authority to enact.2 6
In invalidating the Guilderland traffic impact fee law, the
court of appeals ruled that the area of roadway improvement
financing was preempted by comprehensive state law.2 67 Ironi-
cally, the court failed to recognize that the state legislature
had just granted the home rule law request of the Town of
North Castle to create a traffic improvement district.26 This
law provides a distinct financing mechanism different from
the state highway financing laws.2 69 Apparently, the legisla-
ture does not interpret this area as being completely
preempted.27
The state legislature has also been sending inconsistent
signals to local governments regarding capital infrastructure
financing. Through the creation of Town Law section 190, the
legislature delegated authority to the towns to create special
improvement districts in order to raise needed local revenues
for capital projects. 271 The law mandates that a district is to
be funded only by those residents benefitted, and according to
such benefit. 272 Section 190 does not provide authority for
roadway improvement districts.2 " Presumably, the rationale
for such exclusion is that it is more difficult to limit the bene-
265. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d at 368-69, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334
N.Y.S.2d at 144.
266. See supra notes 173-238 and accompanying text.
267. Albany Area Builders Ass'n v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372, 377, 546
N.E.2d 920, 922, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (1989).
268. 1989 N.Y. Laws ch. 452.
269. Id. See N.Y. HIGH. LAW art. 10, §§ 260-292 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1991).
270. See supra notes 160-162 and accompanying text.
271. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 190 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1991).
272. Id.
273. See Kent Dev., Inc. v. Town of North Castle, No. 87-022804, slip op. (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Nov. 4, 1988); 1986 Op. N.Y. St. Compt. No. 53 (Aug. 13, 1986); 1981 Op.
N.Y. St. Compt. No. 353 (Oct. 26, 1981).
1990]
43
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
fits from such a district solely to those within its boundaries
since roads are used by all citizens, and therefore state financ-
ing laws for highways are preemptive. "" However, as noted,
the state legislature has recently granted individual home rule
law requests for authority to create traffic improvement dis-
tricts."' The fees collected in these districts are to be based
on the town planning boards' determination of derived bene-
fit. 76 Further, the traffic improvement district authorized for
the Town of North Castle resulted after invalidation of a traf-
fic impact fee law. 77 Can this be interpreted to mean that
such a home rule request is also a viable option for the Town
of Guilderland? If so, will the town be able to apportion a
greater amount of the benefit/cost to new development,
thereby creating a similar result as that intended by the im-
pact fee ordinance?
It is inconsistencies such as these that make an area ripe
for legislative action.278 The court of appeals has refused to
rule that a mechanism to charge new development for the cost
of accommodating it with improved capital infrastructure is
unconstitutional. Rather, it has repeatedly held that local mu-
nicipalities do not have the inherent authority to impose such
mechanisms absent a delegation from the state legislature. In
holding back from addressing this issue, the court seems to be
prodding the legislature to act.
The next section analyzes new legislation that could re-
solve some of the present inconsistencies plaguing the area of
growth management.
VII. State Legislation
"Zoning ...is essentially a legislative act. . . .[I]t is
274. See N.Y. HIGH. LAW §§ 260-292 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1991).
275. See supra notes 151-162 and accompanying text.
276. See 1989 N.Y. Laws ch. 452, § 2.
277. Kent Dev., No. 87-022804, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 4, 1988).
278. See Moriarity v. Planning Bd., 119 A.D.2d 188, 192, 506 N.Y.S.2d 184, 187
(1986)(the appellate division noted that it was inconsistent interpretation of planning





quite anomalous that a court should be required to per-
form the tasks of a regional planner. To that end, we
look to the Legislature to make appropriate changes
"279
As noted at the outset of this Comment, the state legisla-
ture has been content to leave matters of zoning and planning
in the hands of local governments by delegating this authority
with a broad brush. The resulting mass of litigation, as munic-
ipal officials test the limits of this authority to address the
changing scene of community planning, has placed the state
judiciary in the role of law and policy maker. As noted in Ber-
enson, this is a position the court is not comfortable with.280
The issues of growth management affect towns and vil-
lages statewide. Though zoning practices are applied locally,
they often have a substantial impact beyond the boundaries of
a single municipality.2 81 Guidance from the state legislature,
in the form of new acts or amendments to current statutes,
could eliminate much of the trial-and-error planning and re-
sulting litigation. In these times of fiscal paucity, the time and
resources of local governments could be better spent in the
communities rather than at the courthouse.
The final section of this Comment recognizes three areas
where legislative guidance could resolve some of the litigious
inconsistencies over authority for current local zoning prac-
tices. The first is the park land and in-lieu fee provision of
Town Law section 277.282 The second is transportation devel-
opment districts, and the third area is impact fees.
The purpose of Town Law sections 276 and 277 is to pro-
vide for the future growth and development of the town, af-
fording adequate facilities for the health and welfare of its
residents.8 3 In line with this purpose, the statute requires the
279. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 111, 341 N.E.2d 236, 243,
378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 682 (1975).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
282. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 277 (McKinney 1987); accord NY. VILLAGE LAW § 7-730
(McKinney 1973).
283. N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 276, 277 (McKinney 1987).
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provision of park land or in-lieu fees as a precondition to de-
velopment approval.284 However, sections 276 and 277 pertain
only to the approval of subdivision plats. Certain types of de-
velopment, namely garden apartments and condominiums, do
not require subdivision plat approval.28 Similarly, cluster
subdivision plat approval is governed by section 280-a which
does not contain the park land or fee requirement.2 6 Much
litigation has arisen challenging the extension of this require-
ment outside of section 277. Recently, the court of appeals has
ruled that the park land or in-lieu fee provision is meant to be
applied to all new development regardless of whether ap-
proval under section 276 and 277 is required.281 However,
these decisions come on the heels of prior decisions which re-
fused to interpret these provisions so broadly. 88
By clarifying the language of section 277, to assure that
all new development, whether it be seeking subdivision,"8 "
cluster subdivision, 90 or site plan approval,291 contributes its
fair share to meet the park and recreational needs of the
town, the legislature will close up present loopholes and con-
firm and preserve the recent court of appeals rulings. At the
same time that the scope of section 277 is being expanded, a
provision should be included to prohibit a municipality from
exacting a double fee, such as could potentially occur if an in-
lieu fee is collected from the original subdivider of the plat
and later from an individual home builder seeking site plan
approval.
Clarification regarding the computation of in-lieu fees will
also be beneficial, not only for the municipalities, but for the
developers as well.2 92 The legislature should indicate whether
284. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 277 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1991).
285. See supra notes 215-216 and accompanying text.
286. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 280-a (McKinney 1987).
287. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 130.
289. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 276 (McKinney 1987).
290. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 280-a (McKinney 1987).
291. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 274-a (McKinney 1987).
292. See REGIONWIDE ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, at 47-49. A survey of develop-
ers indicated that payment based on known standards and defined in an ordinance is




these fees are to be set charges per lot or unit and applied
equally to all development approvals as necessary dedications,
or rather, based on a formula according to current municipal
need or mitigation of anticipated impact of the new develop-
ment.193 Such uniform guidance, legislated by the state and
incorporated into local zoning ordinances, will provide ade-
quate notice to the development community and potentially
decrease equal protection and takings claims. 9 "
Another area where legislative action will be helpful, and
in fact seems imminent, is transportation development dis-
tricts. Town Law section 190, which authorizes towns to cre-
ate special improvement districts, excludes major transporta-
tion improvements from the list of authorized projects for
which districts may be created and revenue raised.2 95 How-
ever, the state legislature has granted special home rule re-
quests for the creation of transportation districts in areas of
special need.2 6 As more and more areas of the state experi-
ence rapid growth, with resulting traffic congestion, it seems
inefficient to require them all to petition the legislature indi-
vidually. Legislative options include an amendment to Town
Law section 190, adding transportation development districts
to the list of other authorized districts, or enactment of a sep-
293. See Bayswater Realty & Capital Corp. v. Planning Bd., 76 N.Y.2d 460, 560
N.E.2d 1300, 560 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1990). The court of appeals indicated that planning
boards may exact park land or in-lieu fees upon a pre-determination of present and
future need for park and recreational facilities in the town based on projected popu-
lation growth, to which the particular development will contribute. Id. at 470, 560
N.E.2d at 1306, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 628. However, in the companion case to Bayswater,
Weingarten v. Town of Lewisboro, 144 Misc. 2d 849, 542 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (Sup. Ct.
1989), aff'd, 160 A.D.2d 668, 559 N.Y.S.2d 807, appeal dismissed, 76 N.Y.2d 934, 564
N.E.2d 670, 563 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1990), the court of appeals refused to review the su-
preme court's decision, which validated a set fee per lot, pending the outcome of the
Bayswater remand. 76 N.Y.2d 934, 564 N.E.2d 670, 563 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1990).
294. See generally Bayswater Realty, 76 N.Y.2d 460, 560 N.E.2d 1300, 560
N.Y.S.2d 623 (1990); Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 74 N.Y.2d 423, 547 N.E.2d 346,
548 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1989); Weingarten, 144 Misc. 2d 849, 542 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (Sup. Ct.
1989), afJfd, 160 A.D.2d 668, 559 N.Y.S.2d 807, appealed dismissed, 76 N.Y.2d 934,
564 N.E.2d 670, 563 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1990)(in all three actions, the plaintiff-developer
raised equal protection and takings claims with regard to in-lieu fees under Town
Law section 277).
295. See supra note 142.
296. See supra notes 148-162 and accompanying text.
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arate transportation development district enabling act.
A bill amending the New York Town Law to authorize
towns to establish transportation development districts was
introduced in the State Senate in May of 1989.97 Sections 10
through 18 of the proposed act would have amended Town
Law article 12.29s The amendments provided authority for the
establishment of transportation development districts in the
same manner as other authorized improvement districts. 9
The expense of establishing a transportation district was to be
assessed according to Town Law section 202(3), as a charge to
all lots within the district, proportionate to derived benefit.300
The bill never gained support in the legislature.
Potential shortcomings of an amendment such as this in-
clude the failure to enumerate the types of improvements that
a district could be formed to finance; the failure to give guid-
ance on how boundaries for such districts were to be deter-
mined; and the failure to give guidance on how to determine
the proportionate benefit derived, especially since roadways
are used by more than just district residents.
The neighboring states of Pennsylvania and New Jersey
have both adopted individual transportation development dis-
trict statutes. 01 While both are general enabling acts, they
provide specific guidance to be carried out by the authorized
agency. The New Jersey act designates county governments as
lead agencies, while providing for participation by state, local,
and private representatives.302 The Pennsylvania act delegates
authority to municipalities, while providing for necessary co-
ordination with state and regional agencies.30 3
The New Jersey act sets forth criteria to be used for de-
termining district boundaries, and requires the districts to
297. S. 5150, 1989 N.Y. St. Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 1-18 (1989).
298. N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 190-202 (McKinney 1987).
299. S. 5150, 1989 N.Y. St. Leg., Reg. Sess. § 12 (1989).
300. Id. § 17. See N.Y. TOWN LAW § 202(3) (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1991).
301. N.J. Transportation Development Act of 1989, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 27:1C-1 to
-18 (West Supp. 1990); Transportation Partnership Act, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§§ 1621 to -26 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
302. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 27:1C-4 to -5 (West Supp. 1990).




conform to the county master plan." 4 Once a transportation.
development district is designated, the county must establish
another plan to include a listing of the necessary improve-
ments, and a financial program that establishes how each im-
provement is to be funded, including costs and funding
sources.30 This plan must also include a formula for deter-
mining the amount of the fee to be assessed in the district.306
Recommended criteria include numbers of trips generated,
square footage, number of employees, or number of parking
spaces.307 The fees collected are deposited in a separate trust
fund and can only be allocated for projects in the approved
plan.308 The plan is subject to public hearing before being sent
for state approval.30 9
The Pennsylvania act delegates exclusive authority for
the creation and operation of the transportation development
district to the governing body of the state's municipalities.3 10
The act lists the types of facility projects and services that
may be undertaken and provided within the district.311 A se-
ries of financial mechanisms for district projects is also enu-
merated.31 2 Included is an assessment on each benefitted
property within the district, using a formula adopted by the
municipality based upon actual or projected usage of the
transportation facilities or services to be financed.313 The act
also calls for a comprehensive study to determine the program
of projects to be so financed, 14 and the act provides for re-
funds upon cancellation of projects or services. 315
The comprehensive nature of these two acts makes them
ideal models for alternatives to the ill-fated amendment to
304. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:1C-8 (West Supp. 1990).
305. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:1C-5 (West Supp. 1990).
306. Id.
307. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:1C-8 (West Supp. 1990).
308. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27"1C-7 (West Supp. 1990).
309. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:1C-5 (West Supp. 1990).
310. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1622 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
311. Id.
312. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1623 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
313. Id.
314. 'PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1624 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
315. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1625 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
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Town Law section 190.316 However, if serious consideration is
to be given to the transportation district mechanism, it should
be noted that the program in Pennsylvania has not been as
successful as hoped for. 17 It seems that municipal officials are
wary of creating new ordinances which will be perceived as a
means to increase taxes, since the program requires assess-
ment of existing residential properties in the same manner as
new development.318 Such a mechanism will probably run into
the same resistance in New York.
The final area where the state legislature can clarify local
government zoning authority is impact fee enabling legisla-
tion. Legislatures in over nineteen states have now explicitly
delegated authority to local governments to exact some of the
costs of accommodating growth and development from devel-
opers and new residents.3 19 These legislative provisions range
from general language permitting local governing bodies to
charge new development a proportionate share of the costs of
new or expanded services,320 to detailed, comprehensive im-
1
316. See supra notes 297-300 and accompanying text.
317. TRANSPORTATION PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 146, at 9.
318. Id.
319. This figure was acquired from a review of state zoning laws. The state stat-
utes listed below are those that contain specific provisions for charging developers
fees as a condition on building approval. (Not included are states where authority to
impose fees has been implied from state constitutions and general police power dele-
gations. See supra note 15.) ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-1101 to -1109 (Supp. 1990);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-463.05 (1990); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66000-66007 (West Supp.
1991); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65971 (West 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 29-1-801 to -804
(Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3202 (West 1990); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-71-1 to -
13 (Supp. 1990); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 121, paras. 5-901 to -919 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 4354 (Supp. 1990); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A, §
2(6)(33)(ii) (1990); MD. ENV'T CODE ANN. § 9-722(a)(1) (1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
462.358 (West Supp. 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 278B.010 to .320 (Supp. 1989); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-42 (West Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 223.297 to .314 (1989);
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit 53, §§ 1501-A to 1507-A (Purdon Supp. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 46A-10B-21 (Supp. 1990); TEx. LOCAL GOV'T CODE §§ 395.001 to .080
(Vernon Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5200-5206 (Supp. 1990); VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.1-466 (Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-498.1 to .10 (Supp. 1990); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 39.92.010 to .901 (Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-20-1 to -10
(Supp. 1990).
320. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-463.05 (1990)(a municipality may assess develop-
ment fees to offset costs to the municipality associated with providing necessary ser-
vices to development); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3202 (West 1990)(encourages the use of
50http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol8/iss1/7
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pact fee enabling laws;321 from laws authorizing collection of
fees for type-specific projects or improvements, 2 to encom-
passing lists of public improvements that may be funded by
impact fees. 3 3
Three of the five states bordering New York - New
Jersey, 24 Vermont,2 5 and Pennsylvania s2 - have all enacted
innovative land development regulations, including impact fees); MD. ANN. CODE art.
23A, § 2(b)(33)(ii) (1990)(empowers municipal corporations "to establish and collect
reasonable fees and charges. . . [a]ssociated with the exercise of any governmental or
proprietary function authorized by law to be exercised by a municipal corporation");
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-42 (West Supp. 1990)(governing body may require developer
to pay his pro-rata share of the cost of providing reasonable and necessary improve-
ments); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-466 (Supp. 1990)(pro-rata share provision).
321. ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 11-1101 to -1109 (Supp. 1990)(effective Sept. 1990); CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 66000-66007 (West Supp. 1991)(effective Jan. 1, 1989 and amended
1990); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-71-1 to -13 (Supp. 1990)(effective Apr. 4, 1990); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 121, paras. 5-901 to -919 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990)(effective July 26, 1989);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 4354 (Supp. 1990)(effective July 11, 1989); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 278B.010 to .320 (Supp. 1989)(added 1989); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 223.297 to .314
(1989)(added 1989); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 1501-A to 1507-A (Purdon Supp.
1991)(approved Dec. 19, 1990); TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE §§ 395.001 to .080 (Vernon
Supp. 1991)(effective Aug. 28, 1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5200-5206 (Supp.
1990)(effective July 1990); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-498.1 to .10 (Supp. 1990)(effective
July 1, 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 82.02.050 to -.090 (Supp. 1991)(effective
1989); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-20-1 to -10 (Supp. 1990)(effective July 1990).
322. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65971 (West 1989)(permits impact fees to finance new
school facilities); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, paras. 5-901 to -919 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1990)(road improvement impact fees); MD. ENV'T CODE ANN. § 9-722(a)(1)
(1987)(sewer and water impact fees); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 1501-A to 1507-
A (Purdon Supp. 1991)(transportation capital improvements impact fee); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 46A-10B-21 (Supp. 1990)(stormwater basin development fee); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-498.1 to .10 (Supp. 1990)(road impact fee); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 39.92.010 to .901 (Supp. 1991)(transportation impact fee).
323. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 11-1101(14) (Supp. 1990); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66002 (West
Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-71-1(16) (Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §
4354(1)(A) (Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 278B.020 (Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
40:55D-42 (West Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 223.299 (1989); TEx. LOCAL GOV'T
CODE § 395.001 (Vernon Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-466 (Supp. 1990); WASH.
REV. CODE § 82.02.090 (Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-20-3(a) (Supp. 1990).
324. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-42 (West Supp. 1990).
The New Jersey enabling statute is the most general delegation of the three. It
provides:
The governing body may by ordinance adopt regulations requiring a devel-
oper, as a condition for approval of a subdivision or site plan, to pay his pro-
rata share of the cost of providing only reasonable and necessary street im-
provements and water, sewerage and drainage facilities, and easements there-
for, located outside the proprietary limits of the subdivision or development
51
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impact fee enabling legislation. Yet, the state of New York,
which has long prided itself as a leader in land use zoning
since the days before Euclid v. Ambler,327 has failed to suc-
cessfully put forth its own enabling authority to permit local
governments to shift some of the burden of accommodating
increased growth.128
but necessitated or required by construction or improvements with such sub-
division or development.
Id.
Other than this general grant of authority, the only guideline mandated by the stat-
ute is that the pro-rata share be established by fair and reasonable standards. Id.
Such a statute leaves much to the discretion of the local governments and has led to
continued litigation over its proper application. See Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Town-
ship of Holmdel, 121 N.J. 550, 583 A.2d 277 (1990); New Jersey Builders Ass'n v.
Mayor of Bernards Township, 108 N.J. 223, 528 A.2d 555 (1987).
325. VT. STAT ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5200-5206 (Supp. 1990).
The Vermont enabling statute is more comprehensive and detailed than the New
Jersey statute. The statute grants authority to municipalities to create an ordinance
to "require the beneficiaries of new development to pay their proportionate share of
the cost of municipal and school capital projects which benefit them and to pay for or
mitigate the negative effects of construction." Id. § 5201(2)(a). The statute requires
that an ordinance be based on a comprehensive capital budget and program, listing
proposed projects, their costs, sources of funding, and scheduling. Id. § 5203(a)(1).
The statute also requires that the ordinance contain a reasonable formula for assess-
ing the impact fee. Id. § 5203(a)(2). The fee amount is restricted to be "equal to or
less than the portion of the capital cost of a capital project which will benefit or is
attributable to the development .... Id. § 5203(b). The statute also contains provi-
sions for collection, accounting, refunds, and exemptions. Id. §§ 5203-5205.
326. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 1501-A to 1507-A (Purdon Supp. 1991).
The Pennsylvania statute is the most recent as well as most comprehensive of the
three. The statute authorizes municipal governments, by way of local ordinance, to
exact off-site transportation capital improvement fees from new development. Id. §
1503-A. Like the Vermont statute, Pennsylvania requisites its impact fee ordinances
on comprehensive transportation capital improvement plans. Id. § 1504-A. The stat-
ute goes into extreme detail describing a series of required reports to be included in
the plan in order to determine the need for present and prospective capital improve-
ments. Id. The statute outlines a formula for establishing the impact fees based on
the costs of capital improvements attributable to new development. Id. § 1505-A. The
statute further mandates a series of administrative provisions pertaining to fee collec-
tion, including time for collection, refunds, time limits on spending, creation of spe-
cial escrow accounts, public notice, and appeal procedures. Id. §§ 1505-A, 1506-A.
327. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
The first "comprehensive zoning" ordinance was adopted by the City of New
York in 1916. New York City, N.Y., Building Zone Ordinance (1916). See R. ANDER-
SON, supra note 2, at § 1.14. See also Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 229
N.Y. 313, 128 N.E. 209 (1920)(zoning law proper exercise of police power).
328. A bill was introduced in both the Senate and Assembly of the New York
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The current trend among states facing or anticipating in-
creased development pressures is the comprehensive impact
fee enabling statute. Since 1989, thirteen states have enacted
some form of comprehensive impact fee enabling statute for
exaction of impact fees.32 9
The creation of comprehensive impact fee enabling stat-
utes is intended to serve a two-fold purpose. First, an effective
enabling statute eliminates the ultra vires, or lack of local
government authority issue.330 Second, such a statute offers
the state the opportunity to direct local governments toward
the development of a constitutionally sound impact fee
ordinance. 81
To eliminate ultra vires challenges to local impact fee or-
dinances, the enabling statute should include certain provi-
sions describing the extent of authority delegated. The statute
should clearly identify the following: (a) the governing bodies
that may impose impact fees;332 (b) those from whom fees
Legislature to amend Town Law section 277 in relation to the approval of plats. S.
6018, A. 8405, 1989 N.Y. St. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1989). The amendment provided:
As a further condition of approval, in addition to that which is otherwise
permitted or allowed by statute, local law or resolution, the planning board
may require provisions for further public improvements, or payment therefor,
depending on the area, size and impact of the proposed new plat, develop-
ment or subdivision. The payment shall be to the town of a sum to be deter-
mined by the town board, which sum shall constitute a trust fund to be used
by the town as exclusively for the purposes for which said sum is required.
Improvements to facilities which may be required under this section are, but
shall not be limited to, water facilities, roads, libraries, sewage treatment
plants, firehouses or apparatus, schools, police and any other public needs
generated by the proposed development.
Id.
The bill failed to gain approval most likely because it left too much deference with
the local town boards, much like the New Jersey statute.
329. See supra note 321.
330. See Morgan, Strauss, & Leitner, State Impact Fee Legislation, LAND USE L.
& ZONING DIG., Jan. 1988, at 3, 4.
331. Id.
332. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1102(A) (Supp. 1990)(counties); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 66000(c) (West Supp. 1991)(local agencies which can impose fees include a county,
city, whether general law or chartered, city and county, school district, special dis-
trict, authority, agency, any other municipal public corporation or district, or other
political subdivision of the state); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 121, para. 5-903 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1990)(counties with a population of over 400,000 and all home rule
1990]
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may be exacted; 3 ' (c) the types of facilities, improvements,
and services for which fees may be collected and expended
for, 3 as well as those for which fees may not be collected and
expended for;3 and (d) when the fees may be exacted. 336 The
statute should mandate that all impact fees be implemented
according to a local ordinance created pursuant to the state
enabling act. 3 7 The statute should also establish a compre-
hensive procedure for enacting the local impact fee ordinance,
including provisions for public input.338
An effective enabling statute should address and remedy
municipalities).
333. GA. CODE ANN. § 36-71-2(5) (Supp. 1990)(fees imposed on all development,
which is defined as "any construction or expansion of a building, structure, or use,
any change in use of a building or structure, or any change in the use of land, any of
which creates additional demand and need for public facilities"); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch.
121, para. 5-903 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990)(fees imposed on new development, which
is defined as "any residential, commercial, industrial or other project which is being
newly constructed, reconstructed, redeveloped, structurally altered, relocated, or en-
larged, and which generates additional traffic within the service area or areas of the
unit of local government").
334. TEx. LocAL Gov'T CODE § 395.012 (Vernon Supp. 1991)("Items Payable by
Fee"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 4354(A) (Supp. 1990)("Infrastructure facilities
include, but are not limited to: 1)waste water collection and treatment facilities; 2)
municipal water facilities; 3) solid waste facilities; 4)fire protection facilities; 5)roads
and traffic control devices; and 6)parks and other open space or recreational areas.").
335. TEx. LOCAL Gov'T CODE § 395.013 (Vernon Supp. 1991)("Items Not Payable
by Fee"); NEv. REv. STAT. § 278B.280 (Supp. 1989)("Prohibited Uses of Impact
Fees"); OR. REV. STAT. § 223.299(1)(b) (1989)(" 'Capital improvements' [for which fees
are collected] does not include costs of the operation or routine maintenance of capi-
tal improvements.").
336. Tax. LOCAL GOV'T CODE § 395.016 (Vernon Supp. 1991)("Time for Assess-
ment and Collection of Fee"); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-498.6 (1990)("When Impact Fees
Assessed and Imposed").
337. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1102(A) (Supp. 1990)("A county may not assess,
impose, levy or collect a development fee for a public facility unless it has adopted a
development fee ordinance pursuant to the development requirements of this chap-
ter."); Tax. LOCAL GOV'T CODE § 395.011(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991)("Authorization of
Fee. Unless otherwise specifically authorized by state law or this chapter, a govern-
mental entity or political subdivision may not enact or impose an impact fee.").
338. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1107 (Supp. 1990)("Development Fee; Hearing;
Notice; Procedures"); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 121, para. 5-905(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1990)("Procedure for the Imposition of Impact Fees. A unit of local government in-
tending to impose an impact fee shall adopt an ordinance or resolution establishing a
public hearing date to consider land use assumptions that will be used to develop the
comprehensive road improvement plan."); TEx. LOCAL GOV'T CODE §§ 395.041 to .058
(Vernon Supp. 1991)("Procedures for Adoption of Impact Fee").
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the regulatory fee/unauthorized tax controversy."' 9 The stat-
ute should include provisions to clearly distinguish the fees
from the general tax rolls. To do so, the statute should require
that the local ordinance specifically limit and identify the
projects that fees are being collected for. 40 The statute should
mandate that the maximum fee exacted be no higher than a
proportionate share of the total cost of the necessary improve-
ment.34 1 A provision should be included to refund any excess
fees above the cost of the improvement. 4 The statute should
require that the local ordinance set a time limit on spending
the fees, with another provision for refund of unused amounts
after the period expires.3 4 3 The enabling statute should also
require that the funds be segregated into individual escrow
accounts earmarked for specific projects.4 This will prevent
commingling of the fees with the general treasury fund and
further support classification of the charges as regulatory fees
rather than unauthorized taxes.3 45
The comprehensive enabling statute also offers states the
opportunity to orchestrate constitutionally sound local impact
fee ordinances. In considering the constitutional challenges to
339. See Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
340. ARmz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1102(B) (Supp. 1990)("Development fees may be
imposed only for one or more public facilities which are identified in a benefit area
plan."); OR. REV. STAT. § 223.299 (1)(b) (1989)(" 'Capital improvements' [for which
fees are collected] does not include costs of the operation or routine maintenance of
capital improvements.").
341. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5202(b) (Supp. 1990).
342. TEX. LocAL GOV'T CODE § 395.025 (Vernon Supp. 1991)("If the impact fee
calculated based on actual cost is less than the impact fee paid, the political subdivi-
sion shall refund the difference if the difference exceeds the impact fee by more than
10 percent.").
343. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §5203(e) (Supp. 1990)("The municipality must spend
the fee on the capital project, for which the fee was intended, within six years of
when the fee was paid. If it fails to do this, the owner of the property. . . may apply
for . . . a refund of his proportionate share of the fee. ... ).
344. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1105(3)(a) (Supp. 1990)("[D]evelopment fees
shall be accounted for in a fund that clearly identifies the type of public facility for
which the fee was imposed, and development fees shall be invested with all interest
accruing to the fund."); TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE § 395.024 (Vernon Supp. 1991)("Ac-
counting for Fees and Interest").
345. See Keenan, supra note 21, at 338-39.
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impact fee ordinances, i.e., takings,346 due process," '4 and
equal protection,4 8 the framers of the state enabling statute
should be cognizant of two relationships. The first is the rela-
tionship between the impact fee condition and the public pur-
pose for which it is exacted. 349 The second is the relationship
between the impact fee and the development from which it is
exacted.35
The United States Supreme Court, in Nollan v. Califor-
nia Coastal Commission,351 addressed the first relationship
when it considered a regulatory takings challenge to a local
zoning ordinance. The Court held that the ordinance, which
conditioned a building permit on the dedication of a public
easement along a beach, did not substantially advance its
claimed public purpose, and was therefore an unconstitutional
taking.352 This standard has been interpreted to apply to con-
ditional fee ordinances, requiring that such fees substantially
advance an explicit state interest. 3 3
To obviate such a challenge, or to provide a good defense
in the event one should still arise, the enabling statute should
clearly state the public purpose for which the fee is to be col-
lected. 4 To support this purpose, the statute should also re-
quire that the local ordinance specifically define the projects
that the fees will be expended for. This can be achieved by
346. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
347. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
348. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. See supra notes 178-181 and accompanying text;
see also Keenan, supra note 21, at 336.
349. Morgan, Strauss, & Leitner, supra note 330, at 5.
350. Id.
351. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
352. Id. at 842.
353. See Keenan, supra note 21, at 338, 339. Cf. Morgan, Strauss, & Leitner,
supra note 330, at 5. See also Weingarten v. Town of Lewisboro, 144 Misc. 2d 849,
542 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (Sup. Ct. 1989), aff'd, 160 A.D.2d 668, 559 N.Y.S.2d 807, appeal
dismissed, 76 N.Y.2d 934, 564 N.E.2d 670, 563 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1990)(applying the Nol-
Ian standard to exaction of in-lieu fees).
354. GA. CODE ANN. § 36-71-1(b)(2) (Supp. 1990)("It is the intent of this chapter
to [p]romote orderly growth and development by establishing uniform standards by
which municipalities and counties may require that new growth and development pay





requiring that the local ordinance be based on a detailed com-
prehensive public improvement plan.3" This plan should re-
port on the present and prospective need for improved public
facilities, the proportion of this need attributable to new de-
velopment, the costs of the improvements, all potential fund-
ing sources, and a time schedule for implementation. 3" The
more detailed this plan is, the stronger the relationship be-
tween the fee and its public purpose, and therefore the
stronger the justification for imposition of fees to help fund it.
The second relationship that should be addressed in
framing a constitutionally valid impact fee enabling act is the
relationship between the fee and the development that it is
exacted from. Common law has generated three standards for
reviewing this relationship in fee ordinances. They are the
"specifically and uniquely attributable test,""'  the "rational
nexus standard," s" and the "reasonable relationship test."359
In designing an enabling statute to address constitutional
challenge, the legislature should incorporate one of these stan-
dards.360 Guidance for the standard that would be applied in
New York may be interpreted from case law dealing with in-
355. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1504-A (Purdon Supp. 1991)("Transportation
Capital Improvements Plan").
356. Id. See also TEx. LOCAL GOV'T CODE § 395.014 (Vernon Supp. 1991)("Capi-
tal Improvements Plan").
357. Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 380,
176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1961)("[I]f the burden cast upon the subdivider is 'specifically
and uniquely attributable to' his activity, then the requirement is permissible
358. See Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n v. Palm Beach County, 446 So. 2d
140, 143-44 (Fla. App. 1983)("[B]enefit accruing to the community generally does not
adversely affect the validity of a development regulation ordinance as long as the fee
does not exceed the cost of the improvements required by the new development and
the improvements adequately benefit the development which is the source of the
fee.")
359. Russ Bldg. Partnership v. City of San Francisco, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1496,
1503, 246 Cal. Rptr. 21, 24 (1987)(transit impact fee ordinance held to impose a
"debatably rational" fee and therefore valid).
360. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, para. 5-904 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990)("Authori-
zation for the Imposition of an Impact Fee. . . .An impact fee payable by a devel-
oper shall not exceed a proportionate share of costs incurred by a unit of local gov-
ernment which are specifically and uniquely attributable to the new development
paying the fee .... ").
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lieu fees. 61
In Weingarten v. Town of Lewisboro, 62 the Supreme
Court of Westchester County applied the rational nexus or re-
lationship standard. Addressing the validity of a $5000 per lot
in-lieu fee, the court ruled that "it is the actual value of the
land which the Town could require reserved as a condition of
subdivision approval which sets the upper limit upon the fee
in lieu of reservation. So long as the fee does not exceed this
level it is not arbitrary or capricious."36s The court also ad-
dressed the equal protection claim that there existed "no ra-
tional basis for requiring a few property owners to bear so
large a proportion of the recreational expenditures of the
Town."'" The court ruled that the "regulation is presumed
valid and must be upheld if the challenged classification is ra-
tionally related to achievement of a legitimate state
purpose." 365
In framing a comprehensive impact fee enabling statute
to address the relationship between the fee and the develop-
ment charged, the New York Legislature is likely to incorpo-
rate the rational nexus standard. When incorporating this
standard, the comprehensive enabling statute should include
more than just general language that the ordinance exact fees
in a fair or rational manner.366 Rather, the comprehensive
statute should further provide direct guidelines for docu-
menting the need for improvements to accommodate new de-
velopment, and the portion of the cost of these improvements
361. Recall that the court of appeals in Albany Area Builders Ass'n v. Town of
Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372, 378, 546 N.E.2d 920, 923, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627, 630 (1989),
refused to consider the constitutional issues regarding the impact fee ordinance other
than the ultra vires issue.
362. 144 Misc. 2d 849, 542 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (Sup. Ct. 1989), aff'd 160 A.D.2d 668,
559 N.Y.S.2d 807, appeal dismissed, 76 N.Y.2d 934, 564 N.E.2d 670, 563 N.Y.S.2d 60
(1990).
363. Id. at 858, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 1017.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 858, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 1018 (citing Trump v. Chu, 65 N.Y.2d 20, 478
N.E.2d 971, 489 N.Y.S.2d 455, appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 915 (1985)). See also Bay-
swater Realty & Capital Corp. v. Planning Bd., 76 N.Y.2d 460, 470-71, 560 N.E.2d
1300, 1305, 560 N.Y.S.2d 623, 628 (1990).




attributable to specific development.367 The first consideration
should necessarily be addressed in the comprehensive capital
improvements plan.368 Provisions should require that this plan
be updated regularly to account for changes in area growth
patterns.3'9
Under the second consideration, assessing a proportionate
share of the costs requires a comprehensive mathematical
formula. For the sake of uniformity and to reduce legal chal-
lenge, direction for this formula should be set forth in the en-
abling statute.3 70 This mechanism must be able to differenti-
ate the costs attributable to new development from those
necessary to maintain or repair existing facilities.3 71 By doing
so, the enabling statute prospectively addresses one of the ma-
jor contentions of the developer community, that impact fees
constitute "double taxation," with the buyer paying for the
same services in both the fees and property taxes.37 2
Another contention of the development community that
may be addressed by the enabling statute is the exclusionary
effect these fee ordinances have on low to moderate income
developments. Since developers generally pass the additional
costs created by impact fees on to the customer, the higher
the fee, the higher the cost per unit, which thus tends toward
exclusion of low to moderate priced development.3 73 Compre-
367. See Morgan, Strauss, & Leitner, supra note 330, at 7.
368. See supra notes 355-356 and accompanying text.
369. TEx. LocAL Gov'T CODE § 395.052(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991)("Periodic Update
of Land Use Assumptions and Capital Improvements Plan. A political subdivision
imposing an impact fee shall update the land use assumptions and capital improve-
ments plan at least every three years.")
370. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10505-A(2) (Purdon Supp. 1991)("The spe-
cific impact fee for a specific new development or subdivision within the service area
for road improvements shall be determined in section 1503-A(a) by the estimated
number of trips to be generated by the new development or subdivision using gener-
ally accepted traffic engineering standards.").
371. Morgan, Strauss, & Leitner, supra note 330, at 7. Oa. REV. STAT. §
223.299(1)(b) (1989)(" 'Capital improvements' [for which fees are collected] does not
include costs of the operation or routine maintenance of capital improvements.").
372. Garb, Developers Complain About 'Hidden Tax', N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1990,
at 5, col. 2.
373. See REGIONWIDE ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, at 48-49. "Since most fees are
charged on a per-unit basis, builders often compensate for these fees by producing
upscale units at lesser densities, despite a regional shortage of moderately priced
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hensive enabling statutes have addressed this issue by includ-
ing an exemption provision allowing local governments to
waive fees for such developments. 3 4
The foregoing has been a sample of various provisions
that states have incorporated in their comprehensive impact
fee enabling statutes in an attempt to create a uniform and
equitable mechanism to allow local governments to raise
needed revenues to facilitate the development of capital infra-
structure necessitated by new growth. It would be prudent for
drafters of subsequent statutes, including the New York Leg-
islature, to avail themselves of these various statutory provi-
sions as models for their own impact fee enabling legislation.
As evidenced above, the developing national trend in this
area is toward more detailed enabling statutes, with the states
directing the form and content of local implementation. Such
comprehensive legislative direction necessarily reduces the
home rule authority of local governments. This is of little con-
sequence for New York, however, as the court of appeals,
through its decision in Albany Area Builders Association v.
Town of Guilderland,37 6 has effectively eliminated all home
rule authority in this area under the guise of preemption.
With this decision, the stage has now been set. All eyes are
focused on the state legislature to see if it will (re)act on im-
pact fees.
VIII. Conclusion
Suburban and exurban areas of New York State are fac-
ing increased pressure to accommodate new growth and devel-
opment. When the present recession ends, this pressure will
no doubt accelerate. Local government revenue-raising mecha-
nisms, in place to assist the provision of adequate public in-
units." Id. at 48.
374. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1105(E) (Supp. 1990)("A county may waive de-
velopment fees for all development that constitutes affordable housing to moderate,
low or very low income households as defined by the United States department of
housing and urban development, provided that the waiver does not result in an in-
crease in the development fee for other properties in the benefit area."); see also GA.
CODE ANN. § 36-71-4(1) (Supp. 1990).




frastructure, are proving inadequate. With continuing cut-
backs in federal spending and the present crisis over the state
budget, little assistance can be expected from these sources as
well. As municipalities struggle to keep their doors open to
new development, it is imperative that they be given authority
to raise needed revenues outside of increasing property taxes.
As demonstrated nationwide, the local impact fee ordinance is
a viable option. If structured properly, such ordinances condi-
tion new development approvals on the payment by develop-
ers of an equitably proportionate share of the cost of off-site
infrastructure necessitated by the new development. To as-
sure proper structure of such fee ordinances, detailed guide-
lines need to be sent down from the state in a comprehensive
impact fee enabling statute. Such a statute delegates the nec-
essary authority to impose such fees, as well as directs local
governments toward the development of equitable and consti-
tutionally sound impact fee ordinances. As a result of the
Guilderland decision, it is only through such state delegation
of authority that local governments in New York can shift
some of their burden for accommodating growth and develop-
ment with necessary infrastructure to the source of this need,
new development.
"Every restriction on the use of property entails hard-
ships for some individual owners. Those difficulties are
invariably the product of police regulation and the pecu-
niary profits of the individual must in the long run be
subordinated to the needs of the community. 3 76
376. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 381, 285 N.E.2d 291, 304, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, 154, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
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